AN

ADDRESS

TO THE

COMMITTEE

OF THE

COUNTY of YORK,

ON THE STATE OF

PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

By DAVID HARTLEY, Esq.

LONDON:

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ADDRESS, &c.

HAVING, upon ſome former occaſions, taken the liberty of addreſſing you upon public matters, whilſt I had the honour of ſerving in Parliament for a moſt reſpectable Borough in the County of York, I hope you will not think it any unbecoming degree of preſumption in me, if I ſtill wiſh to continue in communication of public ſentiments with you, though I have no longer the claim of any parliamentary employment to entitle me, in a public capacity, to that honour. But if any induſtry of mine, in a private ſituation, can be acceptable to you, or in the leaſt degree inſtrumental, in your hands, to promote the objects of thoſe laudable exertions for the public good, which derive additional authority from your name and national importance, I ſhall think myſelf highly honoured, if I may be permitted to throw in the ſincere, though feeble, aid of a private individual towards the common cauſe under your protection. Thoſe principles which have been adopted by you, as the foundation of all your public proceedings, and which, through your means, have found their way to the hearts and feelings of the people of this kingdom, contain a full and complete ſummary of all points, both in doctrine and practice, which can in any way contribute to ſecure the national ſafety, honour, and welfare; with reſpect, therefore, to principles and fundamentals, nothing can poſſibly be ſuperadded. However, as it may be convenient for the information of Gentlemen reſident in the country, who have not had acceſs to authentic parliamentary documents, to give ſome ſtate of the national expenditure, of our enormous debts and taxes, and of thoſe boundleſs parliamentary ſupplies which are annually granted, and waſted in parliamentary in-

fluence, and in ſupport of a ruinous war in America, I will endeavour ſhortly to ſtate ſome plain and undeniable facts on the foregoing topics, leaving the reſult to the collective ſentiment of the ſeveral Counties in their public capacities, that they may form a national judgment upon the caſe, and that they may proceed accordingly to take ſuch ſteps as may be neceſſary to prevent the conſummation of public ruin.

I conſider it as a great misfortune, that arguments upon the ſubject of public finances are commonly looked upon as too abſtruſe for general comprehenſion and popular judgment; for the natural tendency of this opinion is to produce an implicit and paſſive ſurrender of the public property and purſe, to the unreſtrained diſcretion of the Miniſter for the time being. It thus happens that the country is kept in a ſtate of profound and unſuſpecting ignorance, in conſequence of the palliations and deceptions which are put upon them by the Miniſter, until defeat, diſgrace, deſpair, and all the convulſive pangs of public ruin ſtrike to the heart. How near we are to this ſtate now I tremble to think; but ſtill there remains this one conſolation, that to be apprized of danger, is the road to ſafety. The watch-word is at length gone forth throughout this kingdom, that *all is not well.* I hope the public vigilance will never be relaxed till we have to ſay *all is well.*

As I wiſh to avoid all the confuſion and embarraſſment, which generally attend the explanation of financial eſtimates, to thoſe who are not more immediately converſant with them, than merely from the reſpective ſhares which they are to ſuſtain of the common profuſion, I will endeavour, before I come to any argumentative application of facts, to ſtate, in a preliminary way, ſuch neceſſary rudiments as will, when once explained, facilitate the whole courſe of the ſubſequent arguments.

The general ſyſtem of national expences falls under three heads, viz. The Navy, the Army, and the Ordnance. There is an ordinary computation upon theſe three heads in the times of peace, which conſtitues what is called the Peace Eſtabliſhment. In the time of war the whole expence of that war

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is incurred upon the exceſs of theſe three articles above the ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment. By comparing the totals of theſe expences in different years of war and peace, we get a clear and indiſputable information of the expence of the war. I will now proceed to ſtate the ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment of this country, and after that I will draw out the expences of the war, and the preſent rate of expence in which we are proceeding.

Ordinary Peace Establishment.

NAVY.	£.	
16,000 Seamen — — — — —	832,000	
Ordinary of the Navy — — —	410,000	
Building and Repairs of Ships — —	284,000	
Extra Naval Expences annually incurred, but not provided for by ſpecific eſtimate	111,000	
		1,637,000

ARMY.	£.	
Eſtimate for Guards, Garriſons, and Plantations — — — — —	1,000,000	
Chelſea Hoſpital and Half-Pay —	230,000	
Staff Officers, Widows, &c. — —	15,000	
Extra Expences of the Army annually incurred, but not provided for by ſpecific eſtimate	269,000	
		1,514,000

ORDNANCE.	£.	
Ordinary Eſtimate of the Ordnance —	170,000	
Extra Expences of ditto — — —	50,000	
		220,000

Recapitulation of the Peace Eſtabliſhment.	£.
Navy — — — — — — —	1,637,000
Army — — — — — — —	1,514,000
Ordnance — — — — — —	220,000
Total ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment	3,371,000

Having

Having thus got a computation of the ordinary Peace Eſtabliſhment, I proceed to ſtate the expences incurred in each year ſince the commencement of the American war, each in totals, under the three foregoing heads, viz.

	1775.	1776.	1777.
Navy	2,496,000—	4,153,000—	4,590,000
Army	2,206,000—	4,799,000—	4,797,000
Ordnance	451,000—	522,000—	620,000
	5,153,000	9,474,000	10,007,000

	1778.	1779.	1780.
Navy	6,173,000—	7,774,000—	8,688,000
Army	6,466,000—	7,405,000—	7,796,000
Ordnance	904,000—	986,000—	1,049,000
	13,543,000	16,165,000	17,533,000

The expences of the firſt five years, in this account, are taken accurately from the Journals of Parliament; but as the preciſe total of the year 1780 cannot as yet be aſcertained, on account of the latitude of thoſe expences which are annually incurred under the title of *Extraordinaries*, and which are not yet made up for the year 1780; for the purpoſe, therefore, of giving the faireſt eſtimate, I have drawn out the expences upon the eſtabliſhment for the year 1780, from the parliamentary votes, and have taken, by preſumption, the Extraordinaries at the ſame amount that was incurred in the year 1779 under that head. As all Military Expences in war uſually run on at increaſing rates, this method of computing the expences of the year 1780, cannot be accuſed of exaggeration. The total Military Expences will therefore be in the reſpective years as follows, viz.

Total Military Expences of the Years — — —	£.
	1775— 5,153,000
	1776— 9,474,000
	1777—10,007,000
	1778—13,543,000
	1779—16,165,000
	1780—17,533,000
	£. 71,875,000

I ſtop

I ſtop this account, for the preſent view, at the termination of the year 1780, not becauſe there is any hope of ſeeing the concluſion of the American war without another and another campaign; but merely to draw into one total the Military Expences which have been incurred and waſted by the late Parliament. Still, however, the above-mentioned ſum of 71,875,000l. will not contain the total of Military Expences incurred to the end of the year 1780; for even if we were to have no farther campaigns, yet the general arrears of the war which would remain to come in within the courſe of a year or two, would amount to an immenſe ſum, probably not leſs than eight or ten millions. For the ſake of bringing the total financial operations of the late Parliament to round numbers, I ſhall ſtate this article of general arrears at the ſum of 8,125,000l. and then the account will ſtand as follows:

	£.
Military Expences incurred and waſted during the ſix Seſſions of the laſt Parliament	71,875,000
General Arrears ſuppoſed outſtanding ——	8,125,000
Total £.	80,000,000

This ſum of 80,000,000l. is only the total hitherto incurred, not that the buſineſs is by any means finiſhed; on the contrary, we are a great deal farther from our original objects than when we ſet out. Thoſe who adviſed the rejection of the petitions from America, have ſo much to anſwer for *on account* to their country already. Let ſo much be obſerved for the preſent: But my principal motive in drawing out the account to this preciſe period, is to bring into cloſe contraſt the promiſes and performances of the Miniſter and his late Parliament.

In the firſt Seſſion of the late Parliament, when the object of Adminiſtration was to lead the public inſenſibly into the adoption of the American war, every fallacious pretext was thrown out to repreſent it as an undertaking of the moſt trivial amount, in point of expence. We were given to underſtand that the loweſt Peace Eſtabliſhment was fully equal to the undertaking. A three ſhilling Land-Tax was voted before Chriſtmas

Chriſtmas in the firſt Seſſion, to take off the alarms of the landed Gentlemen. The number of ſeamen was reduced to a lower eſtabliſhment than they had been at for the four preceding years; they were reduced, at the beginning of that firſt Seſſion, to 16,000 men, which is the loweſt eſtabliſhment for profound peace. Nay, ſtill farther, to carry on the deception to the extremeſt point of inſult, the public was amuſed, in that Seſſion, with paying off a million of the national debt, though an additional debt of double that amount was contracted in the very ſame year.—Theſe were the promiſes of the Miniſter and his late Parliament. I have already ſtated to you their performances. They have waſted fourſcore millions of the public money, for which they have repaid to the public leſs than nothing.

It may, perhaps, be ſaid, that the expence of the war ſhould only be eſtimated at the difference between the War Eſtabliſhment and the Peace Eſtabliſhment; which is undoubtedly true, if we were merely ſpeaking of the additional expence incurred by the war: But the Miniſter undertook, at the outſet, to carry on the war upon the Peace Eſtabliſhment; and this was at that time a principal ground of argument for the original adoption of the war. His own pretext now argues with double force againſt himſelf, when the argument turns upon the general profuſion of the public treaſure. The Peace Eſtabliſhment, by his own argument, became applicable for the purpoſes of the war, and therefore, the whole of this Miniſterial War having failed in every part, the total amount is imputable, as waſted by thoſe who adviſed and who undertook the conduct of the war. However, to make the fulleſt allowance on this point, I will abate as much as the amount of the Peace Eſtabliſhment would have been for the term of the ſix years in queſtion. Would to God they had been years of peace.—The ſum to be abated on this head will be 20,226,000l. which being deducted from the 80,000,000l. above ſtated, the amount of the public treaſure confeſſedly waſted, according to the moſt candid computation, would *only* be 59,774,000l. Take it in round numbers 60,000,000l. waſted in the courſe

of

of ſix years by a Miniſter and his Parliament, who combined together to lead their country into this fatal war, making themſelves reſponſible, at the outſet, not only that no additional taxes or expences ſhould be incurred, but likewiſe that the annual reduction of the National Debt ſhould not be interrupted.

In return for this conceſſion, I think I am now entitled to ſome allowance on the other ſide of the argument. We are not yet got to the end of the war, or of the expences entailed upon us: Many and many millions, I fear, ſtand between this country and that long-wiſhed-for period; and our only conſolation is, that we are invited ſtill to repoſe confidence in the ſame ſyſtem of meaſures, ſupported by a new Parliamentary Liſt, vainly hoping, by ſuch means, to extricate this country from all its ſurrounding evils.

With reſpect to this firſt article of the charge, viz. The waſte of the Public Treaſure, I fear that, before we ſhall ſee the end of this fatal American war, and of all its conſequences, the bill will not amount to leſs than 100,000,000 l. that is to ſay one hundred millions given, granted, and waſted to purchaſe the loſs of all thoſe objects which, at the outſet of the war, we were ſolicited, by the unanimous petitions of America, to accept without conteſt.

Public Money waſted — — £. 100,000,000

But is this the whole of the account? I wiſh it were. But it is very far ſhort of it.—Look at the Proprietors in the Public Funds, and conſider the ſtate of their property. Since the commencement of this moſt ruinous war, there has been a deſtruction and annihilation of at leaſt forty millions of their capital. The public ſtocks have been reduced from 88 l. to 60 l. per cent. a fall of near 30 per cent. upon the whole capital of the National Funds, which, upon a total of more than 150 millions, amounts to more than 40 millions annihilated. So much for the lot of taxation diſtinctly and ſeparately impoſed upon the creditors in the Public Funds, over and above their reſpective ſhare of general taxes upon articles of neceſſity and of daily conſumption. This is no

exaggeration, but a very ſerious and ſearching truth to thoſe who are involved in this kind of property.

I know, when we talk of millions in the diſcuſſion of public arguments, the effect of ſuch arguments, either as warnings or conviction to the public, is partly loſt from the magnitude of the object, which goes beyond the reach of private and individual experience. But in this caſe, the conviction may be brought down to the feeling of each individual. Let the truth be tried by that teſt. Take the caſe of any private perſon having purchaſed 1000l. of ſtock at 88l. the price paid being 880l. Suppoſe this moderate pittance to have been the intended marriage portion of an Orphan, what would it yield now? About 600l. There is a tax upon the Orphan's property nearly to a third part of the total. Let every Stockholder, in the ſame manner, take his pen and compute his particular loſs, the ſame fate awaits them all. The remorſeleſs ſtewards of the public ſay to each man in his turn, For each 100l. which has been committed to our care, take thy pen and ſet down 60l. So much for the Stockholder, who can have no chance of recovering any part of his property but by the reſtoration of peace.

We are now to ſet down for the deſtruction of the capital of the Proprietors in the Public Funds, at leaſt } £. 40,000,000

Let us next go to the Landholder, and make an eſtimate of his ſeparate loſs, over and above his propertion of all other common burthens. In the firſt place, I ſhould not omit to mention the additional ſhilling in the pound, which has been laid on in conſequence of this war, (notwithſtanding the fallacious promiſes of the Miniſter at the commencement of it) and which will probably remain upon his ſhoulder from henceforward for ever. But (which is of infinitely greater importance) let us next conſider what proportion of the Landed Man's capital property is annihilated and deſtroyed. The rent of the land itſelf is fallen, and is ſtill falling every day: The number of years purchaſe is leſs by ſeven years than it was, and the price is ſtill ſo rapidly declining, that it

is

is difficult to catch any preciſe point at which to fix it. Theſe are melancholy truths, of which Country Gentlemen have but too feeling a conviction.—It has always been a difficult queſtion how to aſcertain the National Landed Rental. Different calculations have been made from 20 to near 30 millions per annum, I ſhall, therefore, take a medium, and ſuppoſe, that the Landed Rental, before the war, was about 24,000,000 l. per annum. The capital value of this Landed Rental, at thirty years purchaſe, (which is a moderate computation for the then current price of land) would amount to 720,000,000 l. This *was* the Landed Man's capital. What is it *now*, after the loſs of ſeven years purchaſe in the price of his land, viz. from 30 years to 23 years, and the rent itſelf fallen perhaps to 20,000,000 l. According to theſe premiſes, 20,000,000 l. per annum, at 23 years purchaſe, will amount to 460,000,000 l. the Landed Man's reduced capital *now*. The difference, being 260,000,000 l. is the Landed Man's defalcation; whilſt, upon his reduced remainder, an additional ſhilling in the pound is ſaddled for ever.

As there muſt of courſe be ſome uncertainty in the ſpecifications of ſuch large maſſes of property, therefore, to avoid all ſuſpicion of exaggeration, I will ſtrike off the odd 60,000,000 l. from this account, and I will only ſet to account, as the defalcation of the Landed Man's property, 200,000,000 l. over and above the additional tax of one ſhilling in the pound.

But it may be ſaid of this article, as I ſtated before in reſpect to the annihilation of millions of funded property, that the magnitude of the object aſtoniſhes and confounds the imagination. Then let us likewiſe, in this caſe, reduce the ſcale of this argument, and bring it down to the practical teſt of feeling conviction. Let the appeal be made to the diſconſolate ſenſations of the Landed Man himſelf. Is not every private eſtate of 2 or 3000 l. a year, at this preſent time worth leſs to the owner by 15,000 l. or 20,000 l. than it was? The Landed Man is left to lament his hopeleſs fate in all its

variety of aggravations: His lands are fallen, his tenants are in arrears and breaking, his farms are thrown upon his hands, his debts are called in, his mortgages are foreclosed, and his lands are sold. The fallacious delusion of American taxation recoils upon his own head with new-fangled taxes upon taxes, even to the fatal stamp which seals his ruin.

If one of these unfortunate men should by chance repine at his fate, or if, in the keenness of his anguish, he should happen to curse the Minister; the Minister replies, "Have I deceived you? No! you have deceived yourselves in trusting me; you have been too lavish and unsuspecting in your confidence; thus have you deceived yourselves."—The retort is bitter, and the distinction is accurate; but not more so than it is insulting.—So much for the share of taxation and defalcation, which is thus fallen to the lot of the Landed Man. His hour-glass is running out a-pace; two or three hundred millions-worth of his property destroyed requires no aggravation. Insult added to injury may drive patience itself to madness; but as it is past remedy there let it rest, viz.

Reduction of the capital of the Landed Proprietors, more than } £. 200,000,000

Upon the same line of argument I might proceed to state the loss upon the capital of the Proprietors of House Rents. Supposing a reduction upon all the property of Householders from 7,000,000l. a year, at 14 years purchase, to 6,000,000l. at 12 years purchase;

Here is another defalcation upon this class of men to the loss of } £. 26,000,000

But having given the great line of the argument, I shall not descend farther into the detail. I have only to observe upon this article of the House Rent, that this defalcation likewise is over and above all other taxations. Householders have a feeling proof of this truth from the severe tax which has been recently imposed upon their specific property.—The fundamental maxim of the modern system of finance is, first to destroy, and then to tax.

I will

I will juſt enumerate the preceding Articles. £.

Waſte of Public Treaſure —— ——	100,000,000
Offenſive war with the Houſe of Bourbon	*Nothing done!*
Deſtruction of the capital of the Proprietors of the Public Funds, more than	40,000,000
Deſtruction of the capital property of the Landed Man, more than	200,000,000
Deſtruction of the capital property of Houſe Rents, about	26,000,000
Summation of theſe articles of Public Loſs £.	366,000,000

Theſe are but outlines to ſuggeſt prudent thoughts. I have not yet ſaid any thing of the Manufactures and Commerce of this country. What proportion of their capitals will be annihilated, or rather what will be left, if the ravages of this deſtructive war ſhall be ſuffered to continue? You may already ſee whole pyramids of Engliſh cloth heaped up in the public halls unſold; a drug upon the market without a purchaſer. When the Foreign vent for our Manufactures is ſtopt, and the domeſtic price will not yield a living profit, the honeſt Tradeſman can no longer hold up his head; or if he ſhould endeavour to ſtruggle againſt his fate, then comes a mercileſs liſt of taxes to complete his ruin. The working Manufacturer is dragged, as a recruit, into the bloody ranks of war, from his deſolated labours, and the deſerted loom. He is carried to his grave in that America, which in his, and in his country's better days, gave riches, proſperity, induſtry, and vigour to all.

Look next at the ſtate of Commerce, not only as generally dependent upon the national marine of force, but more eſpecially upon the ſupply of mercantile bottoms. Your merchant ſhips, which uſed formerly to diſtribute the manufactures of this country to the North and to the South, to the Eaſtern and to the Weſtern worlds, are now converted into armed tranſports, loaded with every inſtrument of death; guns, and balls, and powder, and ſwords, and bayonets, and (ſhame to the Britiſh arms) even with *tomahawks* and *ſcalping-knives*.

And

And what remains of the Commerce of a great country, once the miſtreſs of the ocean, is now reduced to take ſhelter in neutral bottoms, or to pay the diſgraceful tax of a tenfold inſurance. America was once the ſource of the Britiſh marine. Three ſhips out of four, upon which the Britiſh Commerce, during its proſperity, was navigated, were of American building. There is an annihilation of three ſhips out of four in the Commercial Capital of this country.

Above all other things the Merchant's grand reſource conſiſts in Credit: Without Credit, Commerce would be reduced to ſimple barter. If the facility of Credit be deſtroyed, it is not a part annihilated, but the whole. In this ſituation every private Merchant is now involved. The utmoſt ſtretch of private Credit is now drawn off from the ſervice and ſupply of National Commerce, to gamble with Government in the Stocks, and to ſupply the ſanguinary profuſion of a miniſterial American war. Every Public Loan that is now made, is a premium ſet upon the private Merchant's head, for his deſtruction; not only by cutting off from him the ſources of ſupply, but by eſtabliſhing in thoſe Loans an uſurious rate of intereſt of 6 or 7 per cent. at which rate, even if the private Merchant could afford to borrow at all, yet the bargain itſelf and the parties would become obnoxious to the penalties of the laws againſt uſury. The Credit of the private Merchant is in the firſt place ſtretched upon the rack, by the enhancement of the rate of intereſt from 3 to 5 per cent. then comes the Miniſter, monopolizing the market by his uſurious bargains, and gives him the finiſhing blow, by making it impoſſible for him to procure a ſupply upon private Credit at any rate.

If any one ſhould ſuſpect that he ſpies a flaw in this argument, as knowing, perhaps, of ſome caſes in which private Merchants do procure money upon their private Credit within the legal rate of intereſt, and below the ſcale of Miniſterial Extravagance; I am ſorry to ſay, that I think the teſtimony of ſuch facts affords but little conſolation; they only prove that, in the opinion of ſome men, the ſecurity of private induſtry

duſtry is thought preferable to all thoſe laviſh offers of a thriftleſs public profuſion, which, in its conſequence, inevitably tends to National Bankruptcy and Ruin.

But to enlarge upon all ſuch topics would be an endleſs taſk. My only view is to ſuggeſt ſome thoughts of prudence to the Landholder, the Houſeholder, the Stockholder, the Manufacturer, and the Merchant, that they may all unite in one common intereſt, and join hands together to put an end to all the fatal waſte and ravages which are thus committed, in conſequence of the preſent deſtructive ſyſtem of public meaſures

Having thus ſhewn, in a few ſtriking inſtances, the deſtruction and devaſtation of public property, which have been brought upon us by the Miniſters of this fatal war, I ſhall now proceed to ſtate the Liſt of perpetual Taxes, and their reſpective computed produce, which have been laid on, in the courſe of five years, by thoſe very Miniſters who led their country into this war, under the falſe pretences of acquiring revenues, reducing taxes, and diſcharging debts.

PERPETUAL TAXES.

1776. *Computed produce per ann.*	£.	
Stamps on Deeds - -	30,000	
——— on News Papers - -	18,000	
——— on Cards - -	6,000	
Additional duty on Coaches, &c. -	19,000	
		73,000
1777.		
Tax on Servants - -	105,000	
Stamps - - -	45,000	
Stamps - - -	10,000	
Additional duty on Glaſs - -	45,000	
Duty on Sales by Auction - -	37,000	
		242,000
1778.		
Tax upon Houſe Rents - -	264,000	
Additional duty on Wines - -	72,000	
		336,000

A TAX

1779.

A TAX *upon* TAXES, *viz.* An additional ſurcharge of 5 per cent. upon the Cuſtoms and Exciſe	314,000	
A tax upon Poſt-Horſes - -	164,000	
		478,000

1780.

An additional tax upon Malt -	310,000	
Additional duty on Britiſh low Wines	20,617	
——— ——— on Britiſh Spirits	34,557	
——— ——— on Brandy -	35,310	
——— ——— on Rum - -	70,958	
Second additional duty on Wines -	72,000	
Additional duty on Coals exported -	12,899	
Additional 5 per cent. on all the above-laid Taxes - - -	46,193	
Additional tax upon Salt - -	69,000	
Additional Stamp Duties - -	21,000	
Duty on Licences to ſell Tea, &c.	9,082	
		701,616

Computed amount of taxes laid in five years £. 1,830,000

I know that ſuch repreſentations as theſe are irkſome and ungrateful. Impatience ſays,—"The money is gone and paſt recalling, let care and vexation go after it. Let us look forward."—I ſay too, "Let us look forward, for we are not yet got half way through the liſt of taxations." Another campaign, that is to ſay, another year's waſte of millions (not to be employed againſt France and Spain) is already announced. Let us be aware, therefore, that the expences of but one more additional campaign, added to the preſent outſtanding debt, will make a total of more than 40 millions, which will require a much longer liſt of taxes than all the foregoing. The foregoing liſt, which was computed to produce about 1,800,000 l. per annum, has not been found productive beyond 1,500,000 l. Three hundred thouſand pounds, therefore, of that work is ſtill to do over again by ſome ſupplemental tortures of taxation; and after this we muſt find another

another liſt of taxes to provide for the intereſt of 40 millions more at 5 per cent. viz. about 2,000,000 l. more per annum for ever.

Surely the time is come to pauſe a little, and to conſider where we are, and what we are doing. The Miniſter declared, by his public acts, at the outſet of the war, that ſo far from apprehending freſh debts or taxes, he was ſuperabundantly provided. He ſuſpended the impoſition of the 4th ſhilling Land-Tax, and ſtill boaſted that he had a ſurplus to diſcharge a million of the National Debt. Who could, at that time, have expected what we have ſince ſeen, and what we now feel? Who could have conceived that, by the end of the year 1781, an hundred millions would have been waſted, and an annual rent-charge of taxes required from this country, to the amount of 3,800,000 l. per annum for ever? As yet we are only got ſo far upon the road of taxation, as in the proportion of 1,500,000 l. to 3,800,000 l. which is conſiderably leſs than half way; and this ſuppoſing the war to be brought to a termination in one more campaign.

I ſhall now produce the documents upon which I have undertaken to ſtate the ſum of 40 millions, as ſtill requiring to be provided for by future taxations. But to prevent any confuſion which may happen in the uſe of technical terms, I will juſt explain what is meant by the term of the Outſtanding Debt, as diſtinguiſhed from the National Debt. The National Debt, properly ſo called, amounts, at preſent, to the capital ſum of 156,000,000 l. To pay the intereſt of this debt, ſpecific taxes have been laid from time to time, as the reſpective loans were made; and this intereſt, as it becomes due half-yearly, is paid at the public offices to the reſpective proprietors. This is the National Funded Debt. The Outſtanding Debt conſiſts of an immenſe number of promiſcuous debts, contracted upon looſe and indefinite accounts according to the Miniſter's diſcretion, without any parliamentary eſtimate, and without any ſpecific funds provided for the payment. The cuſtom of voting ſupplies in Parliament upon eſtimate becomes

a mere fiction, as the Miniſter no longer thinks of confining himſelf to that eſtimate. He runs into an immenſe arrear of many millions unknown to the public, which are kept ſecret and out of ſight, till the amount becomes too enormous to be concealed any longer. This maſs of enormous and unreſtrained profuſion in Navy Bills, Victualling Bills, Ordnance Bills, &c. &c. &c. conſtitute what is called the Outſtanding Debt; and ſooner or later the public muſt be ſeverely taxed for the payment of it. It amounts at preſent to many millions.

The point which I am now going to lay before you is this, That the taxes which it will be neceſſary to lay on for the future proviſion of the outſtanding expences of this war, ſuppoſing it to continue only one campaign more, will exceed the liſt of taxes already impoſed during the war. Malt, and Beer, and Wine, and Houſes, and Servants, and Salt, and Land, &c. &c. muſt be taxed again and again, or ſome other ſubſtantial equivalent taxes muſt be provided.

The following is an eſtimate of the Outſtanding Debt, and of the expence of one additional campaign.

	£.
Navy Debt remaining from 1779 ——	6,857,000
Computed increaſe in 1780, being taken at the ſame rate of increaſe as in 1779 -	3,182,000
Army Extras for the year 1780, taken nearly as in 1779 - - -	2,500,000
Vote of Credit due for 1780 —— ——	1,000,000
Ordnance Extras, 1780 —— ——	450,000
Exchequer Bills outſtanding ——	3,400,000
Deficiency of Grants and of ſeveral Funds and ſeveral Anticipations - - -	1,200,000
Computed Expence of another campaign —	15,000,000
General Arrears at the ſuppoſed concluſion of the war - - - - -	8,125,000
Total £.	41,714,000

This is the real ſtate of the matter without aggravation. Taxes and funds muſt be provided for all theſe millions, which amount to a greater ſum than all the millions which have been funded

funded ſince the commencement of the American war. Here follows the proof. The amount of the money which has hitherto been funded upon the liſt of taxes above recited, is only 32,000,000 l. viz.

		£.
In	1776 —	2,000,000
	1777 —	5,000,000
	1778 —	6,000,000
	1779 —	7,000,000
	1780 —	12,000,000
Loans funded in five years — —		32,000,000
Remaining henceforward to be provided for, as above		41,714,000

I think I am now juſtified in having ſaid that we have not yet run half through the gauntlet of taxation. However, to ſet all poſſible cavil at defiance, in the application of this argument, (as unfortunately there is no occaſion to ſtrain it) I will even cut off 10,000,000 l. the remainder will then be in round numbers 32,000,000 l. That ſum would preciſely require a double liſt of all the preceding taxes of the war, to bring us to the concluſion of one year more, as far as relates to the financial part of the war. Whatever farther annihilations may befal the capital properties of the Landholder, the Stockholder, the Houſeholder, the Manufacturer, and the Merchant, are not included in this or in any of the preceding ſtatements. Let them ſeriouſly reflect on theſe things. The tide of ebb is rapidly running out, and all that they can ſtill call their own, and all their future hopes and fortunes, are *bound in ſhallows and in miſery.*

I will now give you a ſpecimen of the mode in which the accounts of the expenditure of Public Money are preſented to Parliament, paſſed and voted, eſpecially upon the article of *Extraordinaries.* The following is a copy of

An account of the distribution of the sum of 1,000,000 *l. granted to his Majesty to defray any extraordinary expences incurred, or to be incurred, on account of Military Services for the year* 1779.

Dates of Warrants. 1779.		£.	s.	d.
August 3*d.*	To Henry Theophilus Clement, Esq; Deputy Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, to be by him, from time to time, applied for defraying the charges and expences of encampments and other military services in Ireland - -	50,000	0	0
February 3*d.*	To Thomas Harley and Henry Drummond, Esqrs. to be by them applied and invested in the purchasing Spanish and Portugal Coins for the use and service of his Majesty's forces in North America - -	74,834	4	4
March 12*th.*	To ditto for ditto service	11,977	15	7
—— 22*d.*	To ditto for ditto service	49,050	9	2
	To ditto for ditto	200,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	30,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	20,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	31,489	7	3
	To ditto for ditto	62,778	19	9
	To ditto for ditto	4200	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	82,115	16	11
	To ditto for ditto	27,264	15	3
	To ditto for ditto	43,383	9	3
	To ditto for ditto	76,002	12	6
	To ditto for ditto	20,000	0	0
	To ditto for ditto	93,550	2	11
	To ditto for ditto	43,483	18	3
	To ditto for ditto	35,748	13	10
	To ditto for ditto, in part of 352,705l. 12s. 7d.	44,119	15	0
		1,000,000	0	0

War-Office, Feb. 29, 1780.

C. JENKINSON.

If

If ſuch an account as this had been produced as a ſpecimen of the method of regulating the Public Expenditure in any foreign nation of the world, I think it would not have been credited. There is no comment in words which can poſſibly aggravate the abſurdity, or the inſult to common ſenſe, which appears upon the firſt ſight of this extraordinary document. The firſt article is a groſs and lumping article of 50,000 l. for encampments, &c. in Ireland. It does not pretend to be an explanatory voucher, however it ſtiles itſelf at leaſt to be an expenditure. But the remaining 950,000 l. pretends to be nothing elſe but money laid out to purchaſe money. What then! we do not get forward by that piece of information; for the queſtion again recurs, What is become of the Spaniſh and Portugal money ſo purchaſed by Britiſh money? The money ſtill remains unaccounted for. No other account, however, has been laid before Parliament; but upon that very document, without any pretence of explanation whatſoever, they voted the total ſum to be paid, in contempt of the petitions of the people of England, who, *appealing to the juſtice of Parliament, did moſt earneſtly requeſt, that before any new burthens were laid upon this country, effectual meaſures might be taken by the Houſe to enquire into, and to correct, the groſs abuſes in the expenditure of Public Money.* Is it poſſible to conceive a groſſer abuſe in the Public Expenditure? Of what uſe to the nation is the inſtitution of Parliament, if ſuch ſort of accounts are ſuffered to paſs without the leaſt enquiry?

Another account of a ſimilar kind, entitled *Extraordinaries of the Army for the year* 1779, was preſented in the laſt ſeſſion, in which there was a farther ſum of 638,000 l. with no other deſcription or explanation, but merely *To ditto for ditto ſervice.*

In a like manner the Extraordinaries of the Navy are laid before Parliament, in groſs unexplained totals. As a ſpecimen, I have extracted two articles out of the ſtate of the Navy Debt preſented in the laſt ſeſſion, to ſhew you the undiſtinguiſhing

manner

manner in which the Naval Expences are preſented and diſcharged in Parliament, viz.

	£.
Navy Bills —— ——	3,674,852
Victualling Bills ——	2,320,216
	5,995,068

Here are near ſix millions in two lines, which Parliament gives and grants to the Miniſter, without any farther enquiry into the matter.

It is not to be wondered at that ſo good an intelligence ſhould ſubſiſt between the Miniſter and his Parliament, when it is conſidered that the Miniſter, who has the diſpoſal of public contracts, diſtributes immenſe proportions of the public expenditure, through the hands of members of Parliament. Can it be expected that ſuch perſons ſhould be among the foremoſt to inſiſt upon the moſt rigid frugality, or to reſtrain the ſquandering of Public Money, or to reduce all Exorbitant Emoluments? Can it reaſonably be expected that a Miniſter, and his Aſſociates in Parliament, ſhould be ſtrenuous to put an end to the war, on account of any national expences, when the one is to enjoy, in proportion to thoſe very expences, the patronage of beſtowing 10 or 15 millions a year in beneficial contracts and emoluments; and the others have no conſent but their own to conſult, for dividing any ſhare that they chuſe of the public ſpoils?

I have extracted out of the Army Extraordinaries, which were preſented in the laſt ſeſſion, amounting to about 3,500,000 l. the ſpecific proportion of that ſum which paſſed through the hands of members of Parliament. In the firſt place it appears by the ſeveral names in the accounts, that the contracts for 2,016,000 l. out of that ſum ſtand clear under the titles of members of Parliament, unconnected with any others; and that a farther ſum of 370,000 l. conſiſts of mixed contracts jointly to members of Parliament, and other merchants not in Parliament. Upon the whole, three parts in five of all theſe contracts go through the hands of members of Parliament. From this ſpecimen it is no more than fair reaſoning

ſoning to ſuppoſe, that in other branches of the Public Expenditure a ſimilar proportion of the public waſte and profuſion paſſes through the ſame channel.

The amount of this influence, upon a Public Expenditure of 15 or 20 millions a year, is enormous. We ſee it in its effects every day. What would the nation ſay to a propoſition for ſettling the moderate ſum of 4 or 5 millions a year, to be diſpoſed of by the Miniſter without account, in gratifications to members of Parliament voting in his train? The effect, as influential on the repreſentative body of the people, would be the ſame as in the other caſe, but with this material difference to the advantage of the people at large, that they would ſave the uſeleſs expenditure of many millions which they are now involved in, only to ſerve as a cover for the Miniſter's parliamentary patronage. For inſtance, in the laſt ſeſſion a ſum of 12,000,000 l. was borrowed on the public account, and the terms of the loan were ſo conſtructed as to carry a premium of 5, or 6, or 7 per cent. I think the laſt loan ſtood at 7 per cent. which, upon the ſum of 12 millions, would amount to above 800,000 l. This is the amount of the Miniſter's patronage as far as the loan goes. Now would it not be a good bargain for the public, prudently to lay half a million at the Miniſter's feet, or even to pay the full forfeit of 7 per cent. upon the whole ſum, rather than to be put to the additional expence of 12 millions only for a pretext?

The whole ſyſtem of public meaſures is carried on with no other view but to eſtabliſh parliamentary influence, and to ſecure a conſtant majority attached to the Miniſter for the time being, and detached from the intereſt of their country. This is no ſecret, you may ſee a court liſt of the late Parliament, conſiſting of Placemen, Penſioners, and Contractors, ſufficient to ruin any nation in the world. It is well known that the property of many rotten boroughs is veſted in the Miniſter for the time being, under the titles of Treaſury-Boroughs, Admiralty-Boroughs, &c. &c. while for others, the bargain and ſale is made out of his fund of public corruption, which is the Public Purſe. Thus Parliament becomes the repreſentative of

the

the Miniſter, and not of the people. Permit me on this ſubject to quote to you a paſſage in that moſt excellent Addreſs of your worthy repreſentative Sir George Savile, to his Conſtituents at the late general election. His abilities and public virtue give additional weight to every argument which falls from him.

" While the Electors ſell their voices to the Member, and " the Member diſtreſſes his fortune to buy them, *Parliament* " *will be the purchaſe of the Miniſter.* Parliament-Men will " find ways of *partaking other advantages than merely their ſhare* " *in common with you, of thoſe good meaſures which they ſhall pro-* " *mote, and of thoſe good laws which they ſhall enact for your go-* " *vernment and their own:* And the modern-improved arts of " corruption, by contracts, ſubſcriptions, and jobs, is attended " with this perverſe and vexatious conſequence, that their " benefit is not only unconnected with your's, but it grows " upon your diſtreſs. They *feed* on the expence, they fatten " on every extravagance that art and ill conduct can engraft " on the natural diſadvantages of a remote, raſh, ill-fated, " impolitic, and unſucceſsful war. The Miniſter's direct in- " tereſt, (nay his ſafety) mean while, requiring him to puſh " the deſperate game, and even in ſelf-defence to increaſe " that very expence which is his crime; to intrench himſelf " ſtill deeper in corruption, and by headlong and unmeaſured " extravagance to have the means of juſtifying to the faithful " Commons his former miſmanagements and miſdeeds.—— " See where this *ends*, but forget not where it begins."

That miniſterial influence *has* prevailed in Parliament, and that, by the means of ſuch influence, the nation *has been* fatally deceived and betrayed into this *raſh*, *ill-fated*, *impolitic*, and *unſucceſsful* war, are truths too notorious to be denied. We have, therefore, reaſonable ground to apprehend that ſimilar means may at leaſt be attempted for the purpoſe of again deceiving the nation, and leading the preſent Parliament into the

the adoption of the ſame fatal ſyſtem of meaſures. In ſuch circumſtances it is the duty of Conſtituents to watch over their Repreſentatives with a circumſpect and jealous eye. We have lately ſeen two Parliaments diſſolved before the ordinary term of their expiration. In the firſt inſtance, viz. in 1774, the motive avowed for that meaſure was, the introduction of the American war. What has been the motive in the year 1780? The anſwer is obvious, A renewal of the leaſe of that war for another term of ſix or ſeven years. A war which I can call by no other name than a war of Miniſters againſt the ſentiment and real intereſts of their country.

It is the undoubted right of the people of England, in their own concerns, to think and to ſpeak for themſelves, as well as through the intervention of their repreſentatives. This right they will and ought to exert whenever they ſee reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſecret or corrupt means may be uſed to pervert the counſels of their Parliament to purpoſes adverſe to the public good. This is a conſtitutional mode of bringing meaſures to a national teſt unconnected with any private views, or any poſſible biaſs of party. This right they have exerted; let us, therefore, take the voice of the people for our guide. What then is their opinion reſpecting the American war? The County of York have brought that opinion to a public teſt, and have met with the ſupport and concurrence of ſubſequent meetings of other counties, in the following unanimous declaration of their own ſentiments on that head.

At the GENERAL MEETING *of the* COUNTY *of* YORK, *held at* YORK *the* 28*th of* MARCH, 1780,

"RESOLVED unanimouſly, That it is the opinion of "this meeting, that the proſecution of an offenſive war in "America, is moſt evidently a meaſure which, by employing "our great and enormouſly expenſive military operations a-"gainſt the inhabitants of that country, prevents *this* from

" exerting its united vigorous and firm efforts againſt the " powers of France and Spain, and has no other effect upon " America than to continue, and thereby to increaſe, the " enmity which has ſo long and ſo fatally ſubſiſted betwixt " the arms of both, can be productive of no good whatever; " but, by preventing conciliation, threatens the accom- " pliſhment of the final ruin of the Britiſh Empire."

Another unanimous reſolution, of the ſame import, was ſuperadded at the General Meeting of the County of CAMBRIDGE, on the 10th of April, 1780, and adopted by ſubſequent meetings of other counties, viz.

" RESOLVED unanimouſly, That the thanks of this " meeting be given to thoſe Members of both Houſes of Par- " liament, who, foreſeeing and forewarning their country " of the conſequences, have uniformly oppoſed the coercion " of America; and that they be entreated to uſe their wiſ- " dom in accompliſhing, and not even yet to deſpair of ef- " fecting, a re-union with that country on beneficial, juſt, " and honourable terms."

Theſe are the declared ſentiments of many counties, containing, in numbers, ſome millions of our countrymen. And it is undoubtedly the united wiſh of the whole kingdom to ſee peace reſtored with America.

I will now ſtate to you *authentic* evidence of the ſentiments of Miniſters upon this head. On the 27th of June laſt, your worthy member, Sir George Savile, made a motion in the Houſe of Commons, (which I had the honour to ſecond) in the very terms of the unanimous reſolution of his Conſtituents.

IT PASSED IN THE NEGATIVE.

By this contraſt you may form a certain judgment of the principles which guide the meaſures of Adminiſtration, and from principles argue to their intended ſyſtem. The negative given to the firſt part of your reſolution relative to France and Spain, amounts to an explicit declaration, either that the employment of all our powers upon the continent of America, does not prevent the application of thoſe ſame powers againſt the

the Houſe of Bourbon (which is too abſurd even to be aſſerted); or, that Miniſtry are ſyſtematically determined to ſacrifice every intereſt of this country to the Houſe of Bourbon, rather than to relinquiſh the American war: And by contradicting the latter propoſitions it aſſerts in effect, That the continuation of hoſtilities does not contribute to the encreaſe of animoſity, nor an irreconcilable breach with America tend to the ruin, or even the diminution of the Britiſh Empire: that it is, therefore, the plan of Miniſters to widen the deſtructive breach, and to render it irreparable, is incontrovertibly the only inference that can be drawn from the ſanguinary and venal negative, which has thus been put upon the declared ſenſe of a very large and moſt reſpectable portion of the people of England.

We have thus brought the Miniſtry and their country face to face upon this ground; the one for a juſt and honourable peace; the other for war at all events. But Miniſtry contend that they are ſincere for peace: What ſteps have they taken to demonſtrate their ſincerity? Is the refuſal of your propoſition of the 28th of March, 1780, when moved in Parliament by your worthy Repreſentative, a proof of their ſincerity? Is the refuſal of every propoſition or bill of conciliation offered in Parliament, by the friends of peace, without offering any others of their own, to be accepted as a proof of their ſincerity? Have they offered any ſpecific conditions of accommodation to the Colony of Georgia, which has been in their poſſeſſion for near two years? Have they drawn out any line of accommodation with South-Carolina ſince the capture of Charles-Town, or the victory at Camden? Yet ſuch ſteps as theſe would be the ſureſt way of inviting the confidence of the Colonies towards this country, while the omiſſion of them, by creating only alienation and diſtruſt, demonſtrates to a certainty that their diſpoſition is for war.

Miniſters are now profeſſedly carrying on the war for unconditional ſubmiſſion: They will not declare either to this country or to America, upon what terms peace may be prac-

ticable. A bill was offered in the laſt ſeſſion by General Conway, to invite them to ſome ſpecification of conditions. That bill was drawn up upon the cloſeſt terms of dependence; yet even that was refuſed, and, by a parliamentary manœuvre, (of moving for the order of the day) not even the title was ſuffered to appear in the votes. On the ſame day that Sir George Savile moved the Yorkſhire Reſolution, I did likewiſe propoſe a bill of conciliation, which might have been modified to any terms that Miniſtry would have conſented to. It was offered upon that ground, and ſtill rejected: And to render every thing uncertain to the utmoſt, the American Miniſter has frequently declared in his place in Parliament, that the propoſed conceſſions of the commiſſion in the year 1778, are not now to be conſidered as binding this country to any ſimilar propoſitions in future. Every thing, therefore, is looſe and unconditional.

Miniſters profeſs peace in general terms, but whenever they deſcend to particulars, their arguments tend only to war. To certain perſons, who ſtill retain ſome old ſcruples as to the original juſtice of the war, and who would not conſent to the continuance of an *offenſive* war, if they were not inſtructed to believe that America is now become an implacable enemy, and even the aggreſſor, they affirm that the Americans are a nation malignant and hoſtile to Great-Britain, actively engaged in a confederacy with our enemies, ſworn to our deſtruction, and ſo powerful in conjunction with France, that if we were not to keep an immenſe fleet to watch their coaſts, and fifty or ſixty thouſand troops upon the continent *to keep them at bay*, they would ſeize all our remaining iſlands in the Weſt-Indies which are not yet taken from us by France. Upon this ſtate of the argument, "the proſecution of an offenſive war in America," appears quite in a different light from that in which it appeared to the County of York; for it is now become a *defenſive* war on our part for the protection of the Britiſh Weſt-Indies.

But when they are to caſt their nets for another ſet of men, who, having no ſcruples at all, enquire no farther than ſimply this,—"Can we beat them?"—To theſe perſons they reply that—

that—America abhors France; moſt bitterly regrets her alliance, and would do any thing to ſhake it off. That the people there are deſtitute of food and raiment; diſtracted in their counſels; feeble in their efforts; undiſciplined in their ranks; exhauſted in their reſources; harraſſed under military oppreſſions; and groaning under the tyrannous anarchy of Congreſs; and, what is moſt to be depended upon in our favour, univerſally attached to the parent ſtate, and earneſtly longing to return to their antient conſtitutional connexion and dependence.—Strange as it may ſeem, that ſuch contradictory arguments ſhould be applied to the ſame point, yet ſo it is, every man who has ſat in Parliament has heard each of them urged, according to the argument of the day, to inſtigate the relentleſs fury of war.

Another argument for war is, That we cannot make peace till we have reduced the power of France and Spain. "Then "why are not the military operations of this country exerted "with united vigour and firm efforts againſt France and "Spain," inſtead of ſupporting "an offenſive war in Ame-"rica?" This would be the ſenſe of the people of England. But the Miniſter will have it otherwiſe. His plan for reducing the power, and particularly the naval power, of the Houſe of Bourbon, is by a war of millions upon millions upon the continent of America. Such arguments as theſe may paſs current with a miniſterial majority in Parliament; but they are inſults to a nation.

What are you to think when ſuch arguments are impoſed upon you? Every ſuſpicion becomes juſtifiable. This country may become a ſacrifice to France in the event, for a temporary forbearance, whilſt our Miniſters are waſting the ſtrength, and deſtroying the reſources of their country in an American cruſade. *Fears and ſcruples ſhake us.* What are we to think? We know for a certain truth, that, during three campaigns ſince the commencement of hoſtilities with France, our Miniſters have not directed our military force againſt that antient enemy and rival of our greatneſs. We have no reaſon to believe that they mean to exert the force of this country

againſt

againſt the Houſe of Bourbon in the next campaign, for which Parliament has already voted immenſe ſums both for land and ſea-ſervice. It is, therefore, too plain that the honour and intereſts of this country are to be ſacrificed, or at leaſt but ſlackly ſupported in competition with the Houſe of Bourbon.

But, perhaps, if Miniſters do not ſpeak to France out of the cannon's mouth, they may whiſper; and that they have whiſpered has been aſſerted upon no mean authority; for it is aſſerted in a manifeſto bearing date July, 1779, from the court of Spain, *that they* (the Engliſh Miniſtry) *were* inſinuating *themſelves at the court of France, by means of ſecret emiſſaries, and making* great offers *to her*. Is this the way in which Britiſh Miniſters aſſert the honour of their country againſt the Houſe of Bourbon? They have been forewarned for many years of the inſidious deſigns of France; their Miniſter at Paris informed them, from time to time, of many ſpecific arts of interference in the American concerns, long before the French declaration in March, 1778. Yet, after more than twelve months of open hoſtilities, inſtead of "exerting the united, vigorous, and firm efforts of this country againſt the Houſe of Bourbon," they are found proſtrate at a French Miniſter's feet, *inſinuating themſelves with great offers* to procure forbearance and peace. For three campaigns together they have waſted the force and treaſure of theſe kingdoms in a mad and ruinous war in America, knowing that they have left behind us the whole power of the Houſe of Bourbon, lying in wait, with permiſſive forbearance, to watch the maturity of our errors, and then to ſtrike the blow.

Whether ſuch Miniſters may even now be *inſinuating themſelves with great offers* at the court of Spain, cannot be known; but thus much is clear at leaſt, that the unaccountable ſtate of inaction, which has hitherto ſubſiſted in that part of the war which concerns Great-Britain and the Houſe of Bourbon, carries a deceitful and treacherous aſpect. I fear this temporary calm forebodes ſome heavy ſtorm behind.

The

The ſituation of this country is truly alarming, and more ſo upon deeper conſideration of it. Miniſters tell us, and I fear too truly, that it is not poſſible *now* to make peace with America without the conſent of France. But what is their concluſion? That we muſt purſue an offenſive war in America. Yet this is the very cauſe of the embarraſſment: For it is not by virtue of any of the articles of the alliance between France and America, that France can obtain any controul over the acts or views of Great-Britain. Give us back the forces and treaſure which our Miniſters have waſted, and which they are continuing to waſte, in a war upon the continent of America, and we need not aſk the permiſſion of France in the arrangement of any conditions with America. Then ſtrike at the root; direct "the united, vigorous, and "firm efforts of this country againſt France and Spain." It is vain to prolong our undecided fate; if you can, by force of arms, carry compulſion to the Houſe of Bourbon, we are yet a great people, and the firſt of nations. The road will then be open once more to any arrangement with America, free from the controul of France, and Britain may be herſelf again. But Miniſters are obſtinately and inflexibly bent upon their own madneſs, and will not exert the united efforts of their country againſt the inveterate and watchful rivals of its greatneſs. Yet what do they expect to obtain by cringing and *inſinuating themſelves with great offers?* Perhaps that which the Houſe of Bourbon would think it a good bargain to concede without any offers at all, viz. An inſidious and temporary forbearance, while Britiſh Miniſters are exhauſting the Public Treaſure, waſting the blood of their countrymen in vain, and thus preparing to deliver over their country itſelf, weak and defenceleſs, to its natural enemies. What compact could the Houſe of Bourbon wiſh tacitly to eſtabliſh but this, viz. Forbearance on their part, as the condition of perſeverance in the preſent exhauſting ſyſtem of meaſures upon ours.

But, perhaps, it may be ſaid, that one ſucceſsful campaign in America may decide the conteſt, and extricate us

out

out of all our difficulties.—So far from it, in my opinion, that if ſuch an event could happen, it would only be the commencement of our difficulties. The whole force of this country would then be bound down in America for ever. To maintain the conqueſt of ſuch a country in reluctant ſubjection, 3000 miles diſtant, and 1500 miles in its own extent, would require, I believe I might venture to ſay, the whole force of Europe; but would certainly exceed the extremeſt powers of Great Britain. In ſuch a caſe the Houſe of Bourbon would have completely gained their end; at preſent they are to conceive it as a poſſible event at leaſt, that this country may relinquiſh the American war, and that conſideration may ſuſpend their deſigns; but if they could once ſee the whole force of Great Britain bound down and fixt to the continent of America, they would then ſpeak out, their inaction would then turn to activity. A new war would emerge upon us even out of our ſuppoſed victories; a war active and offenſive againſt us on the part of the Houſe of Bourbon, and perhaps brought home with terror and diſmay to our own defenceleſs gates.

That wiſe men "have foreſeen and forewarned their coun-"try of ſuch conſequences," take upon recorded atteſtation; hear then the Proteſt in the Houſe of Lords, March 5, 1776. "If the flames of war ſhould be kindled in Europe, which "we fear is too probable, we reflect with horror upon the "condition of this country, under circumſtances in which "ſhe may be called upon to reſiſt the formidable attack of "our powerful enemies, which may require the exertion of "our whole force, at a time when the ſtrength and flower of "our nation are employed in fruitleſs expeditions on the other "ſide of the world."

Thus much I ſtate upon the ſuppoſed caſe of a total and abſolute conqueſt of America; and, after all, the argument of conqueſt is but a dream. But for the ſake of argument I will go yet farther, and even put the caſe of a general ſurrender and voluntary ſubmiſſion on the part of America, in order to ſhew you that, in every poſſible caſe, the preſent

ſyſtem

ſyſtem of meaſures is abſurd and ruinous, for, on this ſuppoſition, the Houſe of Bourbon ſtill remains to be talked with. In ſhort, the great conteſt of rival power between Great Britain and the Houſe of Bourbon muſt, ſooner or later, be brought to a deciſion: That is now the core of the war. The Houſe of Bourbon have been lying in wait for many years to ſeize the advantage of our folly. By favour of our Miniſters they have at length obtained it, and completely hemmed us in. We can neither make war with America, nor peace with America; nor ſend troops to America, nor withdraw our troops from America, without their conſent. Miniſters know this; they proclaim it; and, becauſe it affords a pretext for procuring another 20 millions for waſte and peculation, they even exult in it; and ſtill, inſtead of exerting the national force againſt the allied Crowns of France and Spain, they perſiſt in their plan of reducing the ſtrength of this country by diverting it to other objects; thereby giving every advantage to the comparative force of our enemies.

But ſuppoſing this voluntary ſubmiſſion complete on the part of America; Can any one conceive that we can ever again poſſeſs the dependence of America without the conſent of the Houſe of Bourbon; or can any one think that France and Spain will give their conſent without the extremity of war firſt tried between them and Great Britain? I think no man can be ſo weak as to flatter himſelf with either of theſe expectations. Conſider the circumſtances. What could be the motives of France for entering into the American Alliance? To ſeparate America from Great Britain. Their whole conduct declares that they conſidered the independence of America as the ground-work: For immediately after the declaration of independence, they received the American Miniſters at Paris, and entered into the negotiation of a treaty of alliance, in which treaty the independence of America was recited as the baſis; nay, ſtill farther, the independence of America is publicly avowed in the French Manifeſto of March, 1778, to Great Britain herſelf, and to all the world, as the baſis of the connexion between France and America. Therefore the in-

 dependence

dependence of America, was the condition upon which alone France would give them their aſſiſtance; that is to ſay, her own independence was the valuable conſideration pledged by America to France as the purchaſe of that aſſiſtance. And the reaſon is obvious, for the independence of America muſt neceſſarily become a matter of deep and ſerious intereſt to France, when by the ſeparation the limits of the Britiſh Empire are contracted, and by the infringement of our monopoly in the American Trade, a diviſion of the ſpoils is not only poured into her harbours for the preſent, but permanently aſſured to her by commercial treaties, which, for their validity, muſt altogether depend upon the free agency and abſolute independence of the contracting party; and therefore, in any of the foregoing caſes, either of conquering America by arms, or of their voluntary ſubmiſſion, the core of the conteſt ſtill remains with the Houſe of Bourbon; and the more we exhauſt ourſelves in a preliminary war with America, the farther we ſhall be from the final power of maintaining and realizing the objects of our purſuit, even if we could by any means acquire a tranſitory poſſeſſion of them in the firſt inſtance.

If the dependence of America is at any time to be recovered by force, (a caſe which I put in compliance with the argument, not as approving or deeming it practicable) there are two parties to be ſubdued. If we begin with the Houſe of Bourbon, and ſhould ſucceed againſt them, we ſhould be ſo far upon the road; but if we ſhould fail againſt them, we had better fail in the firſt inſtance, than fall into their hands, when exhauſted to the laſt gaſp by the continuance of the American war. America would equally be gone in either caſe; but the conſequence to ourſelves, as a nation, would be widely different; for if we exhauſt ourſelves in the preliminary conteſt with America, and ſhould then fall into the hands of France and Spain, we may become, I know not what, even a province to the Houſe of Bourbon! But if we bring the conteſt to an iſſue, in the firſt place, with the Houſe of Bourbon, while our force

force remains equal to the trial; even, if we ſhould fail, yet the diſparity cannot be ſo great, but that we ſhould bring our European rivals down with us, without any fear in that caſe of becoming a province to America.

There are many perſons who, not entering into the intricacies of the war, take the queſtion only in the groſs, and who think that, in every caſe of actual war, they cannot do better than to give general ſupport to the Adminiſtration. To ſuch perſons I recommend that, as a criterion and pledge of fidelity to their country, they ſhall require of thoſe Miniſters whoſe meaſures they have hitherto ſupported too indiſcriminately, to "direct all the united, vigorous, and firm efforts of Great "Britain againſt her invidious and inveterate enemies the "Houſe of Bourbon." I call it a pledge of fidelity from Miniſters, becauſe however other perſons, who are at a diſtance from opportunities of accurate obſervation, may be unapprized of the real ſtate of public danger; yet Miniſters themſelves muſt know that it is by their own ſufferance that the antient and avowed enemies of this country are colluſively permitted to lie in wait for its deſtruction.

If Miniſters will obſtinately plunge their country into a preconcerted ſyſtem of deſtructive meaſures of which they are competent to ſee the fallacy; if all their meaſures are miſcalculated to their pretended objects, and bear no other marks but thoſe of being the creatures of pride, revenge, and peculation; if it then be notorious that they have ſecreted all means of enquiry and information from the public, and uniformly impoſed upon their country by every deluſive miſrepreſentation of the caſe, I ſhall leave the concluſion to this applicable maxim of the Law, *Omnia præſumuntur contra ſpoliatorem.* Conſtructive preſumption is unqueſtionably good againſt them.

It muſt be confeſſed upon the foregoing ſtate of the argument, that if neither the conqueſt nor the ſubmiſſion of America can be productive of any good, the caſe ſeems deſperate.

What then remains to be done? Can it be ſtill poſſible, in the preſent ſtate of the conteſt, aggravated and embarraſſed as it is now become, to look forward to any practicable terms of conciliation with America? That ſome kind of conciliation muſt take place at ſome period or other is moſt certain, becauſe war cannot be eternal. But for the terms, I fear, we cannot expect them now to be ſuch, as thoſe which have been formerly offered to this country by the unanimous petitions of America, and which Miniſters, *in the hour of Inſolence*, have rejected with diſdain. The only rule which we have hitherto ſeemed to follow, has been to refuſe the terms which might have been had at each particular time till it became too late, and then to contemplate the effects of our folly and paſſion with regret. For what remains, at leaſt, let us be wiſer now. We can no longer hope to reſtore the ſtate of our affairs to the condition in which they were when the unanimous petitions of America were rejected. We ſhould not, however, deſpair, they may yet admit of ſome alleviation, if conducted with prudence, moderation, and ſincerity.

I have already ſufficiently explained that the dependence or independence of America upon this country, remains no longer a queſtion to be ſettled ſolely between the original parties to the diſpute. France is now become a principal; it was France that firſt called America forth to independence; it is the Houſe of Bourbon which now aſſerts and maintains that independence with a ſtrong hand, and America herſelf, in the cauſe of her own independence, is now become but a remote and ſecondary party, as far as the deciſion of that cauſe relates to Great Britain. If Miniſters tell us that we muſt fight to the laſt man, and to the laſt ſhilling, to recover that dependence of America which they themſelves have thrown away, then why do they not "direct the united, firm, and vigorous efforts "of this country againſt the Houſe of Bourbon?" From their not doing this, the proof becomes concluſive againſt them, That they are deceiving their country by falſe pretences, and that *their* war is nothing elſe but a war of pride, revenge, and peculation, at the peril and coſt of their country.

But

But to the pretext of continuing the war to recover the dependence of America, is now, I think, almoſt worn out, and Miniſters have accordingly changed their ground, and tell us that France and America are at preſent ſo cloſely connected together, that we muſt carry on the war in America until we have effected a ſeparation between them. But is the continuation of an offenſive war againſt America the way to effect this ſeparation? So far from it, that its only poſſible operation muſt be to drive the connected parties into a more intimate connection; and perhaps, by urging America for the purpoſe of preſent preſervation to the neceſſity of mortgaging to France all her future faculties and reſources, to cement a union beyond the power of Great Britain hereafter to diſſolve. The fallacy is hardly ſpecious.—If they truly and ſincerely ſought to effect a ſeparation, they muſt neceſſarily have adopted that fundamental maxim eſtabliſhed in the reſolution of the County of York; and in the firſt inſtance, have "directed all our "united, firm, and vigorous efforts againſt the Houſe of "Bourbon."

I believe that the wiſh to ſee America releaſed from their engagements with France, and to re-unite that country in friendſhip and affection with ourſelves, is much cloſer to the heart of the people of Great Britain, than the deſire of recovering any reluctant dependence from them hereafter. But can the treaty of alliance, now ſubſiſting between France and America, be ſuperſeded in its operation by any ſteps of relaxation, which could be taken on the part of Great Britain? I think it might, if that ſtumbling-block of independence could but be removed, or even *tacitly* diſpenſed with. I will ſtate thoſe articles of the treaty, which ſeem to me to warrant that opinion: In the firſt place, If Great Britain ſhould think proper, *formally*, to declare the independence of America, the whole treaty of alliance drops to the ground at once: the eſſential and direct end of it being accompliſhed, there is no farther object for the treaty to attach upon, and therefore, as a treaty of alliance, it ceaſes to exiſt. This argument is founded upon the 2d article of the treaty, which declares that "The eſſential and direct

"end

" end of the preſent defenſive alliance is to maintain effectually " the liberty, ſovereignty, and independence abſolute and un- " limited of the ſaid United States, as well in matters of go- " vernment as of commerce." So much for the firſt ſuppoſed caſe of the independence of America, *formally* aſſured by Great Britain.—To the ſecond caſe, viz. The *tacit* ſeſſion of independence, I adduce the 8th article, in which " they mutually " engage not to lay down their arms, until the independence " of the United States ſhall have been *formally* or *tacitly* aſ- " ſured by the treaty or treaties which ſhall terminate the " war." When theſe two articles are compared, together, it appears that in either of theſe caſes, viz. of the independence of America *formally aſſured* or *tacitly aſſured*, the baſis of the treaty is taken away, and therefore, that the treaty itſelf, upon this contingency, becomes a non-exiſtence; becauſe the treaty in queſtion is not a general treaty of alliance, but a ſpecific treaty for the accompliſhment of one, and only one declared end.

I have hitherto only ſpoke of the independence of America as patronized by France againſt Great Britain, upon the general view of hoſtile and rival politics between them; but in the preſent caſe it bears a more ſpecific reference to the treaty of alliance of which we are now ſpeaking. It may appear ſingular at firſt ſight, that a treaty, *the eſſential and direct end* of which is declared to be the eſtabliſhment of American independence, ſhould be entitled a *defenſive alliance* between France and America. But the reaſoning upon which this title is founded will appear upon a deduction of the caſe. I have already ſtated to you that America was dragged into a premature declaration of independence, as a qualification neceſſary to be complied with, before they could expect to receive ſuch ſupport from a foreign independent power, as might enable them to reſiſt the foreign mercenaries which had been hired by the Britiſh Miniſtry for their deſtruction. But this point of procuring aſſiſtance from France was not to be obtained by a ſimple declaration of independence only; for

when

when actual ſupport was to be ſent to them, they were called upon to depoſit ſome valuable conſideration as repayment for that actual ſupport ſo ſent. That valuable conſideration was a treaty of open and free commerce with America. Accordingly a treaty of commerce was previouſly ſigned between America and France on the ſame day, but before the treaty of alliance; in conſequence of which this concomitant treaty of alliance is expreſsly declared to be entered into, for the purpoſe of ſtrengthening and ſupporting the treaty of commerce. For there was evidently a defect of title on the part of America to enter into a treaty of commerce, unleſs as maintaining the rank of an independent ſtate; therefore the eſſential and direct end of the treaty of alliance was to *defend* the treaty of American commerce, by eſtabliſhing that independence which, alone, could give validity to the contract. And France and America are thus joined together to *defend* the title, upon which the one conceded and the other received the treaty of American commerce, as a ſubſidiary compenſation for the aſſiſtance afforded by France to America. But the moment the independence of America is recognized by the only party having any claim againſt it, the validity of the treaty of commerce being eſtabliſhed, France is paid off for her mercenary ſupport, and under that treaty cannot have any further claim upon America.

Beſides, the whole conſtitution of this treaty of alliance between America and France is *defenſive*, ſpecial in its matter, and ſolely directed in the conſtruction of its parts, towards the accompliſhment of one eſſential and direct end, and to no other. Therefore I am aſtoniſhed how it can poſſibly be conceived to carry, in the leaſt degree, the appearance of being a general and perpetual alliance.

As to the ſubordinate articles of this or any other treaty, they are always to be conſidered as being merely inſtrumental in their operations, and finally referable to the fundamental object of the treaty. All the ſubordinate proviſions, ſuch as *making common cauſe*, or *not concluding truce or peace without mutual conſent*, &c. which are of courſe component parts of

every

every treaty of alliance, are to be taken as dependent upon the eſſential and declared end of the alliance, being merely inſtrumental means to accompliſh that end, and having no originality in themſelves, they drop of courſe, upon the effectual accompliſhment of that end towards which they were only intended to ſerve as the efficient and inſtrumental means. Upon the whole matter I do conceive, that upon the *formal* or *tacit* admiſſion of the independence of America by Great Britain, the contracting parties on both ſides become free, and that the alliance itſelf is, *ipſo facto*, diſſolved.

I am aware that this conceſſion may appear to eſtabliſh an alienation of the American trade to France. I grant that it recognizes the infringement of our former monopoly, but do not, for that reaſon, conceive that we enter into a loſing bargain. America, if conquered by the ſword, will ſcarcely be an acquiſition; her waſted territories will be but ill able to ſend money for the manufactures of Great Britain. The mode of government, which tyranny, nay perhaps policy herſelf, upon ſuch a ſtate of circumſtances, muſt eſtabliſh, for the purpoſe of controuling the reluctant remnant of her vanquiſhed inhabitants, will continue the depopulation, and is but ill calculated to foſter the ſecond infancy of American commerce. What then do we alienate by lenient conceſſions? A portion of that trade, the whole of which we muſt otherwiſe annihilate, while we ſtill reſerve a portion to ourſelves; for, if America encreaſe, as on terms of tranquillity and independence ſhe naturally muſt do, ſhe has not yet, by her treaty with France, precluded a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; and a moiety of her cuſtom, in the day of her uncontrouled proſperity, may poſſibly, nay muſt neceſſarily, exceed in profit the utmoſt that Great Britain has ever heretofore received upon the whole.

The independence of America, and the treaty of alliance with France, are now become the great objects of the public attention and anxiety: They muſt ſpeedily be brought to a national deciſion.—The ſummary ſtate of the whole matter is

ſimply

ſimply this, If it ſhould be determined to purſue the dependence of America by force of arms, it muſt be done by beginning with the Houſe of Bourbon. If, on the other hand, it could be thought proper to relax upon the point of dependence, the treaty of alliance between America and France becomes, *ipſo facto*, diſſolved.

Perhaps the ſimple conceſſion of independence to America, as an act of generoſity and free grace, at the period of their approaching maturity, and flowing from ourſelves, might not have met with much reluctance in a wiſe, a liberal, and a magnanimous people; it might, at leaſt, have reſcued the honour of this country in the preſent fatal conteſt. But our Miniſters have cut off this retreat from us, and that conceſſion, which might have been an act of choice, their conduct has rendered an act of compulſion. There are many people who now ſay: "If it were only to America, we would readily concede an amicable independence to the deſcendants of Britiſh blood, and to the heirs of Britiſh freedom; but to France we cannot make conceſſions—there is the rub."—The anſwer is,—"Conciliate with America, and direct the united efforts of this country againſt France and Spain." That is the voice of the people of England; but Miniſters will not hearken to that voice, they will neither act with vigour nor open their hearts to conciliation.

If the public ſentiment and wiſh of this country could but once prevail ſo far as to procure a change of ſyſtem, from the ſanguinary hoſtilities of an offenſive war, to conciliatory meaſures with America, we ſhould, in the purſuit of that conciliation, meet with ſome incidental advantages from the conduct of France towards America. If the court of France have taken ſome advantage of our folly, they have likewiſe, on their part, given us every favourable opportunity of retaliating upon them, and of recovering our own falſe ſteps, if we are ſo diſpoſed to do; for it is evident, that their original interference in the diſpute between Great Britain and America

did not proceed from any principles of generoſity or affection towards America, but from varied ſelfiſh conſiderations of their own national intereſts and ambition. The eſtabliſhment of civil liberty in America could not be an intereſting object to the arbitrary court of France: But under the maſk of magnanimity and pretended zeal for America, to urge on the conteſt, and juſt to feed the hopes of the weaker party, from time to time, with languid and undeciſive ſupport, ſo as to keep that conteſt alive, until both parties ſhould have mutually exhauſted each other, was a plan calculated to gratify every view of pride, of reſentment, of jealouſy, and of ambition. This is the plan which they have uniformly and ſteadily purſued. The whole ſyſtem of their conduct towards America, during three years of their actual interference in the war, has evinced it. In every ſtage they have moſt evidently ſeemed to prolong the continuance of the war, even in its moſt oppreſſive ſhape to America, and, as if in concert with the Miniſters of Great Britain, have made the continent of America the ſeat of war. If, therefore, America is to judge of motives from the uniformity of actions, (than which there cannot be a fairer teſt) the conduct of France cannot appear in any other light to them, than as proceeding from motives of reſentment towards the antient rivals of the Houſe of Bourbon, in Europe; and, perhaps, of jealouſy towards the riſing power of their future rivals in America. This was not the way to conciliate the affections of America to France, neither can it be ſuppoſed to have produced any ſuch effect. There never have been any natural ties of affection between them, for as the alliance, on the part of France, proceeded only from conſiderations of politic prudence, ſo on the part of America it was merely the effect of reluctant neceſſity, to which they were driven by the ſanguinary and vindictive meaſures of a Britiſh Adminiſtration.

Theſe are the principles upon which the alliance between America and France was at firſt entered into by the reſpective parties, and the whole progreſs of it, in all its operations, has been conformable to its original foundation. America and France have very well underſtood each other on that head.

It

It has been a temporary coalition of independent views and intereſts between parties mutually jealous of each other; nor, either according to the letter of the treaty, or to the ſpirit of the alliance, does it extend to any points beyond the preciſe and limited objects of that occaſional coalition. Whatever incidental obligations America may have incurred to France, they are undoubtedly of a limited nature; and as ſuch, they may be ſatisfied and diſcharged whenever Great Britain ſhall hold out an affectionate and conciliatory hand to America. The only way, therefore, to defeat the effect of the French alliance with America, and "to accompliſh a re-union with "that country upon juſt, honourable, and beneficial terms," is to proceed henceforward with ſincerity and conciliatory meaſures towards America, and no longer to permit a ſanguinary adminiſtration to continue in the farther purſuit of their revengeful purpoſes. Moderation and forbearance are the harbingers of peace, but conciliation never comes by the ſword.

It is impoſſible to enforce the generous ſentiments of humanity and peace in terms more expreſſive, or more adapted to the caſe, than by the repetition of your own words, which carry the higheſt authority, as coming from you, and having been adopted by the general voice of the people of England; with theſe words, therefore, I ſhall ſum up this argument of peace, and conclude the whole of this addreſs to you, viz. "That the proſecution of an offenſive war in America can "have no other effect upon America herſelf, than to con- "tinue, and thereby to encreaſe, the enmity which has ſo "long and ſo fatally ſubſiſted betwixt the arms of both, and "that it can be productive of no good whatever, but, by "preventing conciliation, threatens the accompliſhment of "the ruin of the Britiſh Empire."

I hope you will excuſe the liberty that I have taken in addreſſing to you the foregoing thoughts on public affairs. It has proceeded from the higheſt reſpect which I entertain for you, and my fulleſt conviction of the wiſdom of thoſe ſenti-

ments which have received the ſanction of your authority. I conſider it as the duty of every private man, in times of public danger, to take his turn in ſtanding to the watch. Having now no longer any public Parliamentary employment, I am ſolicitous to acquire ſome additional weight to the ſervices of a private individual by the protection of your name. I preſume no farther than argumentatively to ſtate a few important facts, in order to ſupport and to enforce your ſentiments; but the ultimate adoption and influence of thoſe ſentiments upon the public counſels and conduct, muſt be derived from your own importance and authority. It has been declared in Parliament, April 6, 1780, "That it is the duty "of this Houſe (*viz. as being the repreſentatives of the people*) "to provide, as far as may be, an immediate and effectual re- "dreſs of the abuſes complained of in the petitions pre- "ſented to this houſe from the different counties, cities, and "boroughs of this kingdom." By this formal and parliamentary recognition of your rights you know them; it is, therefore, to your own diſintereſted vigilance that you muſt finally look for ſafety. You have already ſtated your complaints of ſuch public abuſes as require redreſs. If, after the recognition of your rights to that redreſs, it ſhould ſtill be withheld, you have the authority of parliament itſelf to declare ſuch a dereliction of duty to be a breach of public truſt. To prevent public affairs from coming to ſuch extremities, ſome effectual and fundamental proviſions ſhould be made, by ſtopping the torrent of public corruption, to maintain and to ſecure the fidelity of the repreſentative body to their conſtituents. It remains with the public wiſdom to ſearch for ſuch ſecurities as ſhall be adequate to the accompliſhment of theſe objects. This great work is already begun by an aſſociated band of virtuous men who can have no other intereſt but the public good, and every honeſt man will lend his heart and his hand to it.

But, believe me, the greateſt of all evils *now*, and that which requires inſtant remedy, is the American war: A war which has had its riſe in pride, and now derives its nouriſh-

ment

ment from corruption: A war which, from contracts, perquiſites, and exorbitant emoluments, may, perhaps, find advocates both in parliament and out of it; but which, I truſt, will receive every conſtitutional oppoſition from the juſtice and diſintereſted wiſdom of the county of York and other aſſociated counties. If ſome ſtop be not put to the American war, according to the unanimous reſolution of the county of York, all your views of public reformation will come too late; you will, alas! have no country to ſave. The American war is not only in its immediate operations deſtructive, but it is the grand ſource from which adminiſtration has ſupplied thoſe torrents of corruption which have long deluged the land: But this is not the whole, the very exiſtence of your country is at the hazard; and unleſs a ſpeedy effect follow your benevolent and patriot determinations, you will have deliberated in vain.

It could hardly be conceived that any aggravations of what has already been ſtated upon this ſubject, were yet remaining; but even now, while I am yet writing, I hear the denunciation of other wars; and the declaration of hoſtilities againſt Holland, in the Britiſh Manifeſto of December 20, 1780, bears tenfold teſtimony to the truth of every preſent calamity, and the probability of every future calamity, that I have ſtated in the foregoing pages of this Addreſs: Nay, I dread that it may prove an omen of farther evils; for Holland alone ſtands not in the adverſe predicament ſtated in the Manifeſto. She formed but an individual member of an alliance entered into by every maritime power in Europe.—The inference is obvious.

We have not a ſingle ally in the whole world, and every man's hand is lifted up againſt us. If you have a ſincere and effectual wiſh to ſerve your country; if you feel for your own perſonal ſafety; or if you have any regard to your poſterity, exert yourſelves to avert thoſe long-freeboded evils which are now encroaching upon us with haſty and tremendous ſtrides. A little cloud aroſe in the Weſt, at the firſt no bigger than a man's hand, it has already caſt its gloom over the horizon of our glory, it is now ſpreading over our heads with darkneſs and diſmay,

diſmay, and is preparing to ſhed a torrent over us, which will overwhelm our name and nation.

Hear the voice of wiſdom and juſtice, O People of England! Lay your hands with ſelf-conviction upon your hearts! Will you ſay that Miniſters, through prerogative, have effected *this* meaſure; or that Parliament, through corruption, have carried *another?* No! You have been yourſelves the efficient agents. You have connived, you have ſuffered the baſe and malignant inſtruments of pride and revenge to ſtalk abroad in purſuit of their tyrannous and ſanguinary purpoſes, without reſiſtance and without controul. They have purchaſed your acquieſcence by a proffered participation of the intended ſpoils of America, and rendered you the inſtruments of enforcing every fatal meaſure. To ſtep forth now to vindicate your country and the rights of mankind, is, therefore, become your more incumbent duty. Sad would it be indeed, if a day of wiſdom ſhould be accounted a day of national humiliation. Then ſtrive no more againſt the dictates of wiſdom, of juſtice, and of humanity!

" A greater power than we can contradict
" Hath thwarted our intents!"

YORK, *January* 3, 1781.

APPEN-

APPENDIX.

N° I.

VOTES *of the* HOUSE *of* COMMONS.

Martis die 27 Junii, 1780.

A motion was made, and the queſtion being put, That leave be given to bring in a bill to inveſt the Crown with ſufficient powers to treat, conſult, and finally to agree upon the means of reſtoring peace with the Provinces of North America.

COPY OF A BILL,

To inveſt the Crown with ſufficient Powers to treat, conſult, and finally to agree upon the Means of reſtoring Peace with the Provinces of North America.

WHEREAS many unfortunate ſubjects of conteſt, have of late years ſubſiſted between *Great Britain*, and the ſeveral Provinces of *North America*, herein after recited, viz. *New Hampſhire*, *Maſſachuſett's-Bay*, *Rhode-Iſland*, *Connecticut*, *New-York*, *New-Jerſey*, *Penſylvania*, *the Three lower Counties on the Delaware*, *Maryland*, *Virginia*, *North-Carolina*, *South-Carolina*, and *Georgia*, which have brought on the calamities of war between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces: To the end therefore that the farther effuſion of blood may be prevented, and that peace may be reſtored, may it pleaſe your Majeſty, that it be enacted, and be it enacted by the King's Moſt Excellent Majeſty, by and with the advice and conſent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this preſent Parliament aſſembled, and by the authority of the ſame, That it ſhall and may be lawful for his Majeſty, by letters patent, under the Great Seal of *Great Britain*, to authoriſe and empower any perſon or perſons, to treat, conſult, and finally to agree with any perſon or perſons, properly authoriſed on the part of the

the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*, upon the means of reſtoring peace between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces, according to the powers in this act contained.

And be it further enacted, That in order to facilitate the the good purpoſes of this act, his Majeſty may lawfully enable any ſuch perſon or perſons, ſo appointed by his Majeſty's letters patent, as aforeſaid, to order and proclaim a Ceſſation of Hoſtilities, on the part of his Majeſty's forces by ſea and land, for any time, and under any conditions or reſtrictions.

And be it further enacted, That in order to lay a good foundation for a cordial reconciliation and laſting peace between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*, by reſtoring an amicable intercourſe between the ſame, as ſoon as poſſible, his Majeſty may lawfully enable any ſuch perſon or perſons, ſo appointed by his Majeſty's letters patent, as aforeſaid, to enter into, and to ratify from time to time, any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourſe* and *Pacification*, which *Article* or *Articles*, ſo entered into and ratified from time to time, ſhall remain in full force and effect for the certain term of ten years, from the paſſing of this act.

Provided alſo, and be it further enacted, by the authority aforeſaid, That in order to remove any obſtructions which may ariſe to the full and effectual execution of any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourſe* and *Pacification*, as before-mentioned: That it ſhall and may be lawful for his Majeſty, by any inſtrument under his ſign manual, counterſigned by one or more of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, to authoriſe and empower any ſuch perſon or perſons, ſo appointed by his Majeſty's Letters Patent as aforeſaid, to ſuſpend for the term of ten years, from the paſſing of this act, the operation and effect of any act or acts of parliament, which are now in force, reſpecting the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*, or any clauſe or clauſes, proviſo or proviſos, in any ſuch act or acts of parliament contained; in as much as they, or any of them, may obſtruct the full effect and execution of any ſuch *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourſe* and *Pacification*, which may be entered into and ratified

as

as before-mentioned, between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*.

And be it further enacted, That in order to eſtabliſh perpetual reconcilement and peace, between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*, it is hereby required, and be it enacted, That all or any *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourſe* and *Pacification*, which ſhall be entered into, and ratified, for the certain term of ten years as before-mentioned, ſhall, from time to time, be laid before the two houſes of parliament for their conſideration, as the perpetual baſis of reconcilement and peace between *Great Britain* and the aforeſaid Provinces of *North America*; and that any ſuch *Article* or *Articles* of *Intercourſe* and *Pacification* as before-mentioned, when the ſame ſhall have been confirmed in parliament, ſhall remain in full force and effect for ever.

And be it further enacted, That this act ſhall continue in force until ——

IT PASSED IN THE NEGATIVE.

N° II.

COPY

Of the TREATY *of* ALLIANCE, *Eventual and Defenſive, between his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty* LOUIS *the Sixteenth, King of* France *and* Navarre, *and the Thirteen United States of* America, *concluded at* Paris, Feb. 6, 1778.

THE Moſt Chriſtian King, and the United States of North-America, to wit, New-Hampſhire, Maſſachuſett's-Bay, Rhode Iſland, Connecticut, New-Jerſey, Pennſylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, having this day concluded a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, for the reciprocal advantage of their ſubjects and citizens, have thought it neceſſary to take into conſideration the means of ſtrengthening thoſe engagements, and rendering them uſeful to the ſafety and tran-

quillity of the two Parties; particularly in caſe Great Britain, in reſentment of that connection, and of the good correſpondence which is the object of the ſaid treaty, ſhould break the peace with France, either by direct hoſtilities, or by hindering her commerce and navigation, in a manner contrary to the rights of nations, and the peace ſubſiſting between the two crowns—And his Majeſty and the ſaid United States having reſolved in that caſe to join their councils and efforts againſt the enterprizes of their common enemy,

The reſpective plenipotentiaries, impowered to concert the clauſes and conditions proper to fulfil the ſaid intentions, have, after the moſt mature deliberation, concluded and determined on the following articles:

ART. I. If war ſhould break out between France and Great Britain during the continuance of the preſent war between the United States and England, his Majeſty and the ſaid United States ſhall make it a common cauſe, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils, and their forces, according to the exigency of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies.

II. The eſſential and direct end of the preſent defenſive alliance is, to maintain effectually the liberty, ſovereignty, and independence, abſolute and unlimited, of the ſaid United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce.

III. The two contracting parties ſhall each on its own part, and in the manner it may judge moſt proper, make all the efforts in its power againſt their common enemy, in order to attain the end propoſed.

IV. The contracting parties agree, that in caſe either of them ſhould form any particular enterprize in which the concurrence of the other may be deſired, the party whoſe concurrence is deſired ſhall readily, and with good faith, join to act in concert for that purpoſe, as far as circumſtances and its own particular ſituation will permit; and in that caſe they ſhall regulate, by a particular convention, the quantity and kind of ſuccour to be furniſhed, and the time and manner of

its

its being brought into action, as well as the advantages which are to be its compenſation.

V. If the United States ſhould think fit to attempt the reduction of the Britiſh power remaining in the Northern parts of America, or the iſlands of Bermudas, thoſe countries or iſlands, in caſe of ſucceſs, ſhall be confederated with, or dependent upon, the ſaid United States.

VI. The Moſt Chriſtian King renounces for ever the poſſeſſion of the iſlands of Bermudas, as well as of any part of the continent of North America, which, before the treaty of Paris in 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain, or to the United States, heretofore called Britiſh Colonies, or which are at this time, or have lately been, under the power of the King and Crown of Great Britain.

VII. If his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhall think proper to attack any of the iſlands ſituated in the Gulf of Mexico, or near that Gulf, which are, at preſent, under the power of Great Britain, all the ſaid iſles, in caſe of ſucceſs, ſhall appertain to the Crown of France.

VIII. Neither of the two parties ſhall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal conſent of the other firſt obtained; and they mutually engage not to lay down their arms, until the independence of the United States ſhall have been formally or tacitly aſſured by the treaty or treaties that ſhall terminate the war.

IX. The contracting parties declare that, being reſolved to fulfil, each on its own part, the clauſes and conditions of the preſent treaty of alliance, according to its own power and circumſtances, there ſhall be no after-claims of compenſation, on one ſide or the other, whatever may be the event of the war.

X. The Moſt Chriſtian King and the United States agree, to invite or admit other powers, who may have received injuries from England, to make a common cauſe with them, and to accede to the preſent alliance, under ſuch conditions

as ſhall be freely agreed to, and ſettled between all the parties.

XI. The two parties guarantee mutually from the preſent time, and for ever, againſt all other powers, to wit—The United States to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty the preſent poſſeſſions of the crown of France in America, as well as thoſe which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace; and his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty guarantees, on his part to the United States, their liberty, ſovereignty, and independence, abſolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and alſo their poſſeſſions, and the additions or conqueſts that their confederation may obtain during the war, from any of the Dominions, now or heretofore poſſeſſed by Great Britain in North America, conformable to the fifth and ſixth articles above-written, the whole as their poſſeſſions ſhall be fixed and aſſured to the ſaid States at the moment of the ceſſation of their preſent war with England.

XII. In order to fix more preciſely the ſenſe and application of the preceding article, the contracting parties declare, that, in caſe of a rupture between France and England, the reciprocal guarantee declared in the ſaid article ſhall have its full force and effect the moment ſuch war ſhall break out; and if ſuch rupture ſhall not take place, the mutual obligations of the ſaid guarantees ſhall not commence until the moment of the ceſſation of the preſent war between the United States and England ſhall have aſcertained their poſſeſſions.

XIII. The preſent treaty ſhall be ratified on both ſides, and the ratifications ſhall be exchanged in the ſpace of ſix months, or ſooner if poſſible. In faith whereof, &c.

The ADDRESS *of the* COMMITTEE *of* ASSOCIATION *for the County of* YORK, *to the* ELECTORS *of the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs within the Kingdom of* Great Britain, *agreed upon at their Meetings, held on the 3d and 4th of* January, 1781, *at* York.

AFTER much diſpaſſionate reflection on the multiplied grievances of our country, on the neceſſity of ſome ſubſtantial redreſs, and the moſt prudent mode of attempting to obtain it, the committee of Yorkſhire have appointed the Rev. Chriſtopher Wyvill, Samuel Shore, Eſq; and Sir James Norcliffe, Bart. their deputies, with full power to meet and deliberate with deputies from other counties, cities, and boroughs, and in concurrence with them to take the moſt effectual meaſures, conſiſtent with law and the conſtitution, to promote that political reform which the county of York has aſſociated to ſupport.

The committee are perfectly ſatisfied that ſuch deputation is ſtrictly legal, and conſonant with every principle of the conſtitution. The right to petition Parliament for a redreſs of grievances, is a fundamental right of the Britiſh people; and the exerciſe of that right, in any mode which is prohibited by no poſitive ſtatute, cannot be unlawful. Let it be acknowledged, then, that this deputation is an uncommon appointment; uncommon diſtreſs has called it forth; and when new dangers ariſe to public liberty, new modes of defence, adapted to reſiſt the attack, are not only juſtifiable, but abſolutely neceſſary for its preſervation. The truth of this obſervation will hardly be conteſted by thoſe, who, underſtanding the nature and value of civil liberty, have the ſpirit to ſupport it, by a ſtrenuous exertion of their legal powers. But it may be expected that much miſrepreſentation and artful ſuggeſtions will be employed by the obſtructors of reformation, to calumniate the committee, and by exciting groundleſs apprehenſions of innovation, and hazardous oppoſition to government, to alienate

alienate the great body of independent electors from the public cauſe. It is not only thought expedient, therefore, to ſubmit to general inſpection the inſtructions of the committee to their deputies; but alſo to ſtate, in a full and explicit manner, their views of public reformation, and the motives of their political conduct for promoting that important work. Whether their interpoſition for that purpoſe be proper or ſeaſonable; whether the means of redreſs they have propoſed be practicable and prudent; whether the end itſelf be juſt and neceſſary; theſe are queſtions in which they feel themſelves too deeply concerned, to pronounce their opinion. To the judgment of their countrymen they appeal: To the deciſion of men of candour, moderation, and upright intentions; to the public they chearfully ſubmit their conduct; with ſuch men they ſincerely wiſh to co-operate; and from their approbation and concurrence they derive their only hope, that the progreſs of corruption may yet be checked by pacific means, and the Parliament of this country may be reſtored in ſome degree to the purity of its original inſtitution.

During the reigns of the four Princes of the Houſe of Stuart, frequent attempts were made, by thoſe weak but ambitious Monarchs, to overturn the conſtitution, to aboliſh Parliaments, and to aſſume by force an unlimited and deſpotic authority. Succeeding Princes, warned by the repeated miſcarriages and final ruin of that family, at the Revolution, ſeem to have adopted a milder but not leſs dangerous mode of attack. From that period, inſtead of violent uſurpation, and declared hoſtility to Parliaments, it has been the prevailing policy of Government to employ the arts of ſeduction, and by creating a corrupt dependence in thoſe aſſemblies, virtually to emancipate the Crown from all controul. For almoſt a century, corruption, with few exceptions, and ſhort, very ſhort interruptions, has been the avowed principle of our Government. The tendency of this fatal ſyſtem has long been ſeen and deplored by the wiſe and virtuous part of the community. But while the reſtoration of the Stuart line was an event within

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any degree of probability, the return of undiſguiſed deſpotiſm was the immediate danger, againſt which the growing influence of the Crown was unwarily cheriſhed as the only adequate defence. In later times, in the full flow of national pride and proſperity, to ſtem the torrent of corruption, had been a vain and unprofitable attempt.

But now, by the unſpeakable infatuation of our councils, the ſcene of national glory is changed; with much of our foreign trade our naval ſuperiority is loſt; our American Provinces are diſmembered from the empire; and our ancient foes, aided by our once friendly ally, and encouraged by almoſt every other European power, are proudly inſulting over this wretched country. At home, agriculture and manufactures decline, as the load of taxes and our public debts increaſe; the national ſubſtance is waſting faſt away by the profuſion of expence in this raſh and unfortunate war; and the influence of the Crown fed by that very prodigality, and increaſed in full proportion to it, is now ſwoln to a moſt alarming magnitude. The ſyſtem of corruption has reached to its maturity; and the criſis of our country is at length arrived. The amputation of that poiſonous tumour, the excreſcence of our vitiated conſtitution, muſt, therefore, be reſolved on, or political diſſolution muſt ſoon be the unavoidable conſequence.

With an alternative like this before them, the choice of freemen is ſoon determined. The committee, therefore, took an early and active part in ſupport of that petition to the Houſe of Commons, which was agreed to at a general meeting of the county of York, on the 30th of December, 1779, and which was ſoon after preſented to that Houſe. With great ſatisfaction they obſerved the ſingular unanimity of ſo many counties and corporate towns, who honoured this county with their concurrence in that meaſure, ſupporting their propoſition for an œconomical reform, and adopting, not unfrequently, the language of their petition. The ſatisfaction of the committee aroſe not from a fond parental partiality for their own production,

tion, but from the juſt hope that concurrence ſeemed to afford, that ſo temperate a reform, requeſted by the general voice of the people, would not be ſolicited in vain from the repreſentative aſſembly. But in theſe expectations, however apparently reaſonable, they have been miſerably diſappointed. The inadequate relief in the mode of collecting the public revenues, with ſome official regulations, which poſſibly may be obtained hereafter, by the dilatory operation of a commiſſion of accounts, is not that reform which the people aſked, and had a right to expect. The memorable but ineffectual vote, that the influence of the crown ought to be diminiſhed, only ſerved to cover that venal aſſembly with eternal ſhame. For not one ſpecific propoſition for diminiſhing the enormous influence of the crown has been granted; not one exorbitant emolument of office has been reduced; not one ſinecure place has been aboliſhed; nor a ſingle penſion unmerited by public ſervice ſtruck off the liſt. Even the motion of the excellent Repreſentative of Yorkſhire, for the production of that liſt, was negatived by a corrupt majority.

The committee may be ſhocked, but they are not diſcouraged, by thoſe evident proofs of the proſtitution of that aſſembly. On the contrary, they are more fully convinced, that the abuſes of Parliament itſelf are become the principal object of public reformation. Among theſe the inequality in the repreſentation of the people may juſtly be pointed out as the fundamental abuſe.

The balance of our conſtitution had been wiſely placed by our forefathers in the hands of the counties and principal cities and towns; but by the caprice and partiality of our Kings, from Henry VI. down to Charles II. it was gradually withdrawn from them, and by the addition of two hundred parliamentary Burgeſſes, was wholly inveſted in the inferior boroughs. From that latter period, the miſchiefs of this irregular exerciſe of royal authority have been farther increaſed by the ſilent operation of time. Many unrepreſented towns have riſen into population, wealth, and conſequence,

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in the kingdom; many boroughs have ſunk into indigence, or have even totally diſappeared, without a trace of their exiſtence left behind them, except the privilege of nominal repreſentation. In theſe decayed boroughs, the Crown and a few great families notoriouſly nominate repreſentatives, who form a clear majority of the Houſe of Commons. In that majority a liberal Miniſter will ever find a ready ſupport, however ruinous the meaſures of his adminiſtration may be to the liberty and the general intereſt of his country. The Members who repreſent the great maſſes of landed and commercial property, ſhall plead in vain for their conſtituents. In the ſcale of parliamentary computation, an inconſiderable village will balance a county; and a ſhort liſt of hamlets, where hardly a veſtige of population is to be found, will decide againſt the general ſenſe and wiſhes of the public. A parliament elected in any reaſonable proportion, would duly repreſent the ſenſe, and act for the intereſt of the whole community; but from a Senate thus unequally arranged, no penal laws, no external regulations can exclude corruption; becauſe in ſituations of no controul, partial advantage will ſtill outweigh the public good. In royal innovation, this groſs abuſe in the repreſentation of the people chiefly originates. From parliamentary authority, a proper counterpoiſe to theſe dependent boroughs muſt be reſtored to the counties and principal cities, &c. before that Aſſembly can become once more a firm and incorruptible guardian of the public weal.

The ſeptennial duration of Parliaments is another manifeſt abuſe which calls aloud for reformation. The ſtatute enacting that regulation was not only a contradiction to the genius of our conſtitution; it was a direct infringement of the triennial law, under whoſe authority that Houſe of Commons then ſat, and had been elected. It was an irregular aſſumption of power, which the alledged neceſſity of the times could hardly excuſe; it was profeſſed to be a temporary expedient, to guard againſt the cabals of the baniſhed Family, and it was

reluctantly ſubmitted to on that ſingle account. But ſince the pretenſions of that Family to the throne have been univerſally exploded, the repeal of the ſeptennial act is a matter of juſtice which ſtate policy no longer forbids, and which the people have the cleareſt right to demand. Short Parliaments are their ancient, indubitable right; they are alſo neceſſary for re-eſtabliſhing that dependence of the repreſentative aſſembly on the conſtituent body, which it is the peculiar aim and advantage of our happy conſtitution to maintain. A more equal repreſentation would reſtore the balance of our government to the bulk of the electors; a ſhorter duration of Parliaments, by returning members more frequently, to be approved or rejected by their conſtituents, as their parliamentary conduct might deſerve, would ever ſecure the fidelity and vigilance of the repreſentative aſſembly. By a temperate reform of Parliament on theſe principles, the ſyſtem of corruption might be effectually excluded, and the enjoyment of our liberties might be tranſmitted to the lateſt poſterity.

Impreſſed with theſe ſentiments, the Committee of Yorkſhire are not diſpoſed to relax in their pacific efforts to reſtore the conſtitution, becauſe the laſt Houſe of Commons thought fit to reject the moſt material parts of the œconomical Petition. The neceſſity for concerting proper meaſures to ſupport that Petition, and alſo to obtain a reform in the principal parliamentary abuſes, only appears more evidently demonſtrable. For if the great conſtituent body requeſted that Houſe in vain to correct groſs and undeniable abuſes; if the alarm at the rapid increaſe of the influence of the Crown, was at once admitted to be juſt and well founded, and yet every meaſure for the diminution of it was rejected with contempt, that Houſe juſtly forfeited the public confidence. In that Houſe, it is plain our domeſtic complaints have their foundation, and without a reformation of fundamental abuſes there, the interpoſition of the people will be worſe than nugatory. Declarations of the public ſenſe, in a regular way, are the ultimate check of the conſtitution on a corrupt Parliament, or a tyrannical Adminiſtration. But it had been bet-

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ter and wiſer far i , he people, patiently crouching under the preſſure of their burdens, had never ſolicited redreſs, than if, after the unjuſt rejection of their requeſt, they ſhould tamely ſurrender their rights, and ſink at once into abject acquieſcence. The people ought not to interpoſe on trivial or light occaſions, but when great and enormous abuſes call forth their exertions, they ought not to interpoſe in vain.

It is neceſſary then, that the collective ſenſe of the public ſhould be ſupported by the moſt efficacious meaſures which can be deviſed, conſiſtent with a ſtrict obedience to the regulations of the law. For the ſyſtem of corruption is an eſtabliſhment of wide extent; and the retainers of that eſtabliſhment form a numerous and well-compacted band, determined to maintain every profitable abuſe with united ſtrength. In oppoſition to that mercenary phalanx, the efforts of a few ſolitary individuals, or even a few unconnected cities and counties, would be too unequal to ſucceed. From the joint endeavours of the public a political deliverance can only be expected. For this purpoſe general aſſemblies of the people, frequently repeated, ſeem to be too operoſe a mode; to give due efficacy to the popular interpoſition, a more compendious method of proceeding ſeems to be adviſable; by which the friends of reformation may be enabled to act with facility and vigour, and yet with the full weight and authority of the whole collective body.

Whether aſſociations in the ſeveral diſtricts of the kingdom, acting by their reſpective committees, and by general deputation from the aſſociated bodies, be the moſt advantageous mode of collecting and ſupporting the ſenſe of the public, the committee of Yorkſhire are conſcious, it is not their part to decide; but it is a feaſible mode; it is a mode conformable to law; and by this mode they truſt, the united efforts of independent men throughout the kingdom will be crowned with final and complete ſucceſs.

The meaſures which the committee wiſh to recommend, as the objects of this general deputation, are,

1. The preſentment of a petition to the new Parliament, equivalent in its prayer to the petition of the county of York.

2. The application to Parliament in ſuch modes, and at ſuch times as may be approved by the majority of deputies, for obtaining at leaſt one hundred additional county members, and for ſhortening the duration of Parliaments to a term not exceeding three years.

If the committee had confined their deputies to ſupport the œconomical petition, without attempting to obtain any correction of parliamentary abuſes, it is plain their ſcheme of reformation would have been a defective ſcheme, and in the preſent circumſtances would not have deſerved the national ſupport. On the other hand, if they had extended their plan of reformation to the utmoſt ſtretch which theory can warrant, they might have propoſed an efficacious reform indeed, but it would not have been attainable. To the zealous advocates for annual parliaments, and the perfect equality of repreſentation, they are moſt ready to concede, that thoſe propoſitions may be ſupported by the ancient practice of the conſtitution, and the genuine theory of civil liberty. But when this country is in manifeſt danger of ſinking under that deſpotic authority, which now tramples on almoſt every other European ſtate, it behoves the friends of the conſtitution not to hazard total loſs of liberty, by aiming at thoretical, but unattainable perfection. In giving circumſtances, that is the moſt eligible plan of improvements, which is the beſt that can be attained. With the metropolis and many counties, theſe conſiderations ſeem to have had their full weight, and by their generous aſſiſtance, with the concurrence of thoſe reſpectable counties, &c. which have already ſupported the œconomical petition, there is every reaſon to expect that conſtitutional improvements may be obtained, which approach as nearly to a perfect ſyſtem of reform, as the temper and actual circumſtances of the nation would allow.

Some excellent perſons, to whom the propoſed plan of reformation appears unexceptionably proper, have yet objected to

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the propoſition at this time. Their concurrence would have been, and ſtill would be received with high reſpect and gratitude. But in the preſent ſituation of diſtreſs, the Committee are clearly convinced, that procraſtination and indeciſion would not be conſiſtent with true political prudence. For when can the correction of abuſes be propoſed with ſuch propriety, or ſo much probability of ſucceſs, as when their miſchievous conſequences are moſt ſeverely felt? What can induce a corrupt Parliament to aboliſh corruption? Not the weight of reaſon; not the force of ſhame, but the authority of the public alone. But the ſame general concurrence of the people, which can reform the corrupt expenditure of public money, with equal eaſe can correct thoſe parliamentary defects, whence that corruption originates. There lies the root of our domeſtic evils; and it is the duty of the Committee to point it out, and to admoniſh their fellow-citizens, that nothing ſhort of a parliamentary reformation deſerves their interpoſition.—Since the defection of Pulteney from the public cauſe, the profeſſions of political men have been held in extreme diſtruſt; diſintereſted men have looked with unconcern on the ſtruggles of contending parties, and, it muſt be owned, contending parties have too generally deſerved it. The individuals who form the ſplendid exception are few, and they have not been able much to diminiſh the popular diſtruſt. Hence the long and unavailing ſtruggle of public men, unſupported by national confidence; hence the reluctance of unambitious men, to embark on any other bottom than that ſtipulated reform of parliamentary abuſes. The diſtreſs of their country has, at laſt, induced ſuch men to make the virtuous attempt. Uninfluenced by perſonal regard, or partial conſiderations; animated with an honeſt zeal for the welfare of the community, they have quitted their private, but independent ſtations, to proſecute a full redreſs of the national grievances; but if a diſpoſition ſhould appear to confine their generous undertaking to the regulation of a few official abuſes, of ſecondary importance in the ſcale of public affairs, it is impoſſible

poſſible to preſerve the ſupport of ſuch men on thoſe conditions, nor on thoſe conditions would this committee wiſh to preſerve it. The general good, therefore, ſeems to require, that the correction of thoſe abuſes in Parliament, which are the foundation of our domeſtic calamities, be now propoſed to the public, as the proper and principal object of their united endeavours.

Having thus freely ſtated to their countrymen their views of reformation, and the motives of their public conduct, the committee truſt that the other counties, cities, and boroughs, who concur in theſe political ſentiments, in whole, or in part, will co-operate with the intended general deputation, by appointing Deputies, with power to ſupport, in that aſſembly, ſuch of theſe propoſitions of reform, as they may reſpectively approve. By a long train of fatal miſconduct, the wealth, the grandeur, the ſuper-eminent power of this empire are, perhaps, irrecoverably loſt. But in the general wreck which threatens the fortunes of the public, their vigorous and timely interpoſition may yet preſerve the Liberty and the Conſtitution of Britain.

The Gentlemen on the Committee preſent at the meeting were.

Rev. Mr. Wyvill, Chairman	Mr. Tooker
The Earl of Effingham	Mr. St. A. Ward
Sir George Strickland	Rev. Mr. Robinſon
Sir James Norcliffe	Mr. H. Oſbaldeſton
Mr. H. Duncombe	Lieut. Col. Thornton
Rev. Mr. Maſon	Mr. Grimſton
Mr. Hildyard	Mr. Marriott
Mr. Chaloner	Mr. Dalton
Rev. Mr. Zouch	Mr. Cradock
General Hale	Mr. T. Weddell
Mr. Morritt	Mr. Dring
Mr. Strickland	Mr. Croft
The Dean of York	Mr. Croft, jun.

Mr.

Mr. Edmunds
Mr. St. Quintin
Rev. Mr. Preſton
Mr. Dixon
Mr. A. Hayes
Mr. Elſley
Sir John Legard
Mr. P. Milnes
Mr. R. S. Milnes
Rev. Fred. Dodſworth
Rev. Mr. Wilkinſon
Mr. Place
Mr. Stansfield
Mr Wolrich
Dr. Swainſton
Mr. Comber
Mr. Walker
Mr. Walker, jun.
Mr. John Milnes
Mr. Maude
Mr. Courtney
Mr. Shore
Rev. Mr. Cayley
Mr. R. Wilſon
Rev. Mr. Bourne
Mr. Wentworth
Mr. Withers
Mr. Sykes
Rev. Mr. Lawſon
Mr. Yorke } elected this
Mr. Battle } day.
Sir William Milner
Mr. H. Thompſon
Mr. Garforth
Mr. Hill

The following Members at this meeting were added to this Committee.

John York, Eſq; of Richmond
Thomas Fenwick, Eſq; of Burrow
Rev. Charles Dalton, of Hawſwell
—— Willis, Eſq; of Sedbergh
Rev. Mr. Gawthorpe, of Sedbergh
William Battle, Eſq; of Welton.

THE END.

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